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In the increasingly dynamic environment of information technology, it has 
become imperative that organizations continue to seek ways to effectively capture and 
measure knowledge in order to survive. With the emergence of a global economy and 
information networks, the knowledge creating capacity within organizations has grown 
tremendously.  As a result, organizations are now shifting their focus to management of 
the knowledge used in executing processes and producing products. As demand for 
quality products and services continues to grow, companies must now find ways to 
effectively manage knowledge intensive processes in order to increase overall process 
capacity. Through Business Process Reengineering and the Knowledge Value Added 
(KVA) methodology, this thesis will seek to identify ways in which the performance of 
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A. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this research is to examine a methodology to increase the process 
capacity of knowledge intensive organizations through objective measurement and 
valuation of deployed knowledge. The National Security Agency / Central Security 
Service (NCPAC) Computer Network Vulnerability Team (CNVT) network assessment 
process is examined as a Proof of Concept (POC).  This process is conducted within the 
complex, knowledge intensive environment of Information Assurance (IA).  Application 
of this model to a knowledge intensive organization provides insight into the relationship 
between the value created through knowledge and the processes in which knowledge is 
deployed, thus contributing to the effective management of knowledge assets and an 
overall increase in process capacity. Through research and critical analysis, this thesis 
will seek to capture the value-adding performance of knowledge assets deployed within 
the CNVT core processes and attempt to identify ways in which process capacity can be 
increased.  
B. BACKGROUND 
As the 21st century begins to take shape, we are witnessing the transition to a 
“new” economy1, characterized by information technologies, global markets and new 
communications networks such as the internet. In this fast developing, ever changing 
environment, value creation within organizational processes has taken on new meaning. 
Increased access to information has developed intellectual assets within an organization 
that contribute significantly to overall value, prompting a shift towards more knowledge-
based organizations where management of knowledge is fast becoming the norm. As a 
result, traditional methods of valuation that measured fixed, tangible assets, such as plant 
equipment, machinery and dollars, no longer present a complete measure of value and 
Knowledge Management has become a primary method of creating value from an 
otherwise intangible asset (Krishna, 2000; Housel and Bell, 2001). In order for these 
                                                 
1 The new economy is often referred to as the Information Economy.  Information now has the 
superior role, rather than material resources or capital, in creating wealth.  (Kelly, 1997) 
 2
knowledge-intensive organizations to continue to thrive, the growing consensus is that 
they must continue to excel at value creation and knowledge management.  This has led 
to an increased interest in intellectual capital, competency assessments, and the 
development of organizational assessments and has spawned the need to objectively 
measure the value of knowledge within an organization (Conger, et al.  1999). 
While searching for means of more effective measurement of knowledge, firms 
must also recognize how to deploy it efficiently. With the customer at the center of an 
enterprise’s business strategy, business processes must be fast, focused and flexible to 
ensure survival in the new economy (El Sawy 2001).  It is not enough for companies to 
just share data, information, and knowledge; this sharing must be centered on core 
processes to ensure maximum value creation. Furthermore, as customer demand for 
quality products and services continues to grow, companies need to find ways to 
effectively manage knowledge intensive processes in order to increase overall process 
capacity to meet the demand. This requires growing intellectual capital and property and 
then discovering how to deploy those assets in the most effective manner (Conger, et al.  
1999). Through application of our chosen methodology, this thesis will seek to 
demonstrate how the performance of knowledge assets can be measured and make 
recommendations to improve the capacity of knowledge intensive processes. 
C. AREA OF RESEARCH 
Based on the literature review, our supporting research can be divided into four 
main areas: 
1. Knowledge Management 
As Information Technology (IT) continues to foster the growth of knowledge, 
knowledge management has become a key element of an organization’s strategy. In this 
section, we will identify reasons why many measures of knowledge management fail to 
provide companies the information that is needed to help increase process capacity, and 





2. Business Process Reengineering 
Business Process Reengineering2 (BPR) provides the detailed method to describe 
the processes where the CNVT knowledge assets are utilized. Research into BPR 
literature serves to help provide a general understanding of how the concept has evolved 
and examines existing frameworks and principles that can be useful in guiding efforts to 
increase the capacity of knowledge intensive processes.  
3. NCPAC Computer Network Vulnerability Team 
The purpose of this section is to provide background information on our proof of 
concept and identify the need for increased process capacity in this knowledge intensive 
organization.  Network assessment methodology and stakeholders are introduced to 
support our research into applying BPR and knowledge management principles.  A short 
discussion on Information Assurance is included to show the context within which the 
CNVT must function. Although not discussed in detail, to further support our research, 
applicable directives will be reviewed to define the procedures that Department of 
Defense (DoD) agencies must adhere to in implementing information assurance in their 
networks.  
4. Return on Knowledge 
We will also devote a section of the thesis to discussion of the Knowledge Value 
Added (KVA) methodology and why it was chosen as our method of knowledge 
valuation.  KVA is a way to objectively capture and measure the relationship between 
knowledge and its associated value within a set of processes and provides the framework 
from which the value-adding performance of knowledge assets can be measured.  As this 
will be our methodology of choice during data analysis, the purpose of this section is to 
introduce the concept as well as the underlying principles on which it is founded.   
Lastly, the data collection and analysis sections of the thesis will be an application 
of BPR principles and the KVA methodology. As a proof of concept, we will apply the 
BPR and KVA knowledge management tools to the network assessment process of the 
CNVT. We will conduct a detailed audit of the major processes involved in conducting a 
                                                 
2 “BPR is in essence a performance improvement philosophy that aims to achieve quantum 
improvements by primarily rethinking and redesigning the way that business processes are carried out.”  
(El Sawy.  P. 6) 
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CNVT network assessment and measure the performance of the knowledge assets 
utilized throughout. Core processes will be modeled to allow for comparison of Return on 
Knowledge (ROK) before and after proposed changes. This case will culminate in the 
recommendation of ways to increase the overall process capacity of the CNVT. 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
The scope of our thesis will encompass BPR for knowledge intensive processes in 
the Information Assurance context. The requirement for network security continues to 
grow as Information Warfare (IW) becomes a mainstream avenue of attack. The 
transformation to Network Centric Warfare3 (NCW) has thrust the Department of 
Defense into the Information Age and emphasis on Information Assurance has become a 
critical element of success.  The NCPAC CNVT is a key contributor to the success of 
DoD’s IA initiatives. Operating within the Pacific Command (PACOM) Area of 
Responsibility (AOR), the team conducts network assessments that attempt to identify 
shortfalls or vulnerabilities of PACOM’s numerous networks.  These assessments result 
in recommendations designed to enhance network security and increase provisions for 
IA.  Since the CNVT is a relatively small unit, its services are continuously in high 
demand.  As such, it is vital that the team be utilized in such a way that maximizes their 
process capacity and overall efficiency. Using process reengineering and the Knowledge 
Value Added methodology, this thesis will provide recommendations for more efficient 
knowledge asset utilization to increase the overall process capacity of the CNVT. 
The concepts applied in this thesis are not specific to CNVT processes. Our POC 
is used to serve as an example of how BPR and KVA can be applied to improve a 
knowledge intensive process.  The concepts and ideas applied in this thesis can be used 
throughout DoD and other agencies in which knowledge intensive processes are 
prevalent.    
 
 
                                                 
3 NCW is that concept that fulfils the goal as set forth in the Joint Vision 202 document that mandates 
that DoD pursue information superiority in that joint forces may possess superior knowledge and attain 
decision superiority across any spectrum of conflict (DoD Report to Congress on  “Network Centric 
Warfare”, 27 July, 2001.). 
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E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
The remainder of this thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter II will consist 
of a literature review to include overviews of the Knowledge Management / Business 
Process Reengineering arenas and their impact on a knowledge intensive organization 
and the CNVT need for increased process capacity. Chapter III will consist of a 
discussion of the KVA methodology, as it is our proposed knowledge valuation method. 
The next two chapters are devoted to our Proof of Concept. Chapter IV will be a 
discussion on collection of data and the methodology surrounding that collection. We 
will conduct a knowledge audit of “as-is” core processes to identify areas in which more 
effective knowledge deployment is likely to result in increased process capacity. In 
Chapter V we will model the proposed “to-be” processes and conduct ROK comparisons 
to the “as-is” processes. Our thesis will conclude with Chapter VI.  Here we will include 
a general discussion of how we answered our research questions as well as provide 
CNVT specific and general recommendations that can be applied to knowledge intensive 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
The importance of knowledge has been emphasized since Sun Tzu reflected on 
the role of information in warfare 2,500 years ago. In The Art of War, he writes: 
Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never 
know peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your 
chances of winning and loosing are equal. If ignorant of both your enemy 
and yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.  
While Sun Tzu’s writings highlight the impact knowledge can have during war, 
this is not a concept unique to military organizations. Over the past decade, the notion of 
managing organizational knowledge has begun to dominate the business strategies of 
corporate America as well. The transition from the Industrial Age to the Information Age 
has brought about an evolution in management that shifts focus from managing people to 
managing the intellectual capital that this new knowledge era has brought about (Krishna, 
2000).  As Britton Manasco4 writes in a Knowledge, Inc5 article “The emergence of the 
knowledge era has left many corporate leaders feeling that something is disturbingly out 
of balance”. Companies are now beginning to realize that their continued success 
depends on their ability to effectively leverage and manage their intellectual capital. 
Rather than reducing head count as a primary means of cutting cost, organizations are 
now finding ways to effectively and efficiently capture and share knowledge and 
expertise as a means of creating value. According to a recent benchmarking study by the 
American Productivity & Quality Center (APQC)6, strategic efforts to manage and 
transfer knowledge more effectively have resulted in overall savings in excess of $700 
million among major corporations that have implemented Knowledge Management 
solutions (Manasco, 1996). 
                                                 
4 Britton Manasco is a market strategist with more than a decade of expertise developing compelling 
initiatives to assess markets and analyze business opportunities. His clients have included Microsoft/Great 
Plains, SAP, SAS, E.piphany, Trilogy, Peoplesoft, IBM, NCR, Motive and Vignette. 
5 Knowledge Inc. is a Web-based resource for executives who are developing their strategic change, 
technology and knowledge management initiatives. 
6 The American Productivity and Quality Center is based in Houston, TX. APCQ is an internationally 
recognized resource for process and performance improvement that helps organizations adapt to rapidly 
changing environments, build new and better ways to work, and succeed in a competitive marketplace. 
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While it is easy to recognize the benefits of pursuing knowledge management 
initiatives, such drastic reductions in bottom line numbers can only be achieved when it is 
implemented properly. With a firm’s success dependent upon its ability to effectively 
manage and leverage knowledge assets, competitive focus has shifted from trying to 
“out-do” one another to trying to “out-know” one another (Housel and Bell, 2001, p1). 
While companies continue to make every effort to know more than the competition, they 
must ensure that knowledge management be implemented properly or the results can be 
disastrous. Stewart (2002) estimates that poorly managed knowledge costs Fortune 500 
companies about $12 billion a year. Daniel Morehead, director of organizational research 
at British Telecommunications PLC in Reston, Va., suggests the failure rate of KM 
projects is close to 70 percent (Ambrosio, 2000). The high failure rate isn’t a result of 
total failure. Rather it is the result of KM projects failing to achieve their stated goals – 
they don’t accomplish what they set out to do because the right information is not 
delivered to the right people when it is needed. What managers are finding today is that, 
as knowledge management initiatives are thrust upon them more and more, the challenge 
still remains to successfully differentiate between intellectual capital that needs to be 
managed and leveraged and that which is of no value to an organization at all. 
1. Knowledge Defined 
Managing knowledge implies that one has defined what knowledge is and knows 
how to manage it. In the case of a financial advisor, for example, who in effect manages a 
client’s financial assets, knowing how to allocate resources depends directly upon how 
the client’s financial goals and objectives are defined and the advisor’s knowledge7 of the 
financial industry.  For the Information Assurance professional, knowing how to assess 
and secure a network depends on how network security deficiencies are defined and 
his/her knowledge8 of the industry. Similar examples can be cited for other management 
fields as well. However, to assist in understanding why knowledge management has risen 
                                                 
7 In this example, knowledge of the industry implies an individual has had some type of formal 
education on the principles and practices of that particular industry and is considered somewhat well versed 
in the tricks of that trade. 
8 Ibid. 
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to the forefront of recent organizational initiatives, we must first develop an 
understanding of what knowledge is.  
Throughout our literature review we found varying definitions of knowledge that 
all presented a common theme: knowledge is more than a simple extension of data and 
information. Data simply represents facts or observations out of context (Zack, 1999). 
Within organizations, data is more easily described as structured records of transactions 
that are usually stored in some sort of technology system (Davenport and Prusak, 1998). 
An example would be a sales database in which data is stored that represents various 
customer transactions with an organization. The data simply describes the facts of the 
transaction: when it was made; what the cost to the customer was; and how many items 
were purchased. They reveal nothing about why the customer chose to do business with 
that particular organization or whether they will chose to do business with them again. In 
effect, data by itself serves little purpose and provides minimal use.  
Davenport and Prusak (1998) describe information as data that makes a 
difference.  Zack (1999) defines information as that which results from placing data 
within some meaningful context. Both agree that information generally exists in the form 
of a message with the intent of conveying something useful from the sender to the 
receiver. Information is a form of communication that exists to make a difference in 
someone’s outlook or provide further insight to the person receiving it. Unlike data, 
however, information has relevance and purpose. In fact, data becomes information when 
its creator adds meaning (Davenport and Prusak, 1998). When data is repeatedly 
transformed into information with some meaningful context, we begin to acquire 
knowledge – that which we come to believe based on the accumulation of information 
through experience and inference (Zack, 1999). Perhaps the most comprehensive 
definition of knowledge is that offered by Davenport and Prusak, which states: 
Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual 
information, and expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating 
and incorporating new experiences and information. It originates and is 
applied in the minds of knowers. In organizations, it often becomes 
embedded not only in documents or repositories but also in organizational 
routines, processes, practices, and norms. 
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This definition effectively captures the meaning of knowledge as it is used within 
the Information Assurance context. The intellectual capital of IA professionals is 
accumulated over years of experience, either from textbooks and training, or practical 
field application. As their expertise grows, so too does the framework from which they 
operate. As a result, information is used more effectively, and vulnerabilities and their 
respective remedies are easier to identify. Furthermore, the more this expertise is used, 
the more it becomes embedded within the different IA processes. Acquiring a complete 
and accurate definition of knowledge, however, doesn’t assist in fully understanding why 
there is much difficulty in capturing and measuring the value of knowledge. 
 
2. Facets of Knowledge 
Throughout our literature review, several key facets of knowledge were identified. 
Knowledge can be classified either as explicit or tacit. Explicit knowledge is that which 
has been easily articulated and is simple to transfer from person to person. It is easier to 
codify and can normally be found shared in documents, databases and other tangible 
media. Unlike explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge is much more difficult to capture and 
share because it is subconsciously understood and developed from direct experience and 
action (Zack, 1999). Tacit knowledge is “deeply rooted in an individual’s action and 
experience, as well as in ideals, values or emotions” that have developed within an 
individual (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).  
Housel and Bell (2001) offer even further insight into our understanding of 
knowledge. Born knowledge is that which is created within an organization to help it 
successfully engage a dynamic environment. This newly acquired knowledge may be 
either human or machine based and is generally focused on the survival and 
maximization of the organization. An example would be Intel’s development of the 
Centrino processor for mobile computing or the development of the alloy for a lighter 
auto body. 
Just as knowledge can be born within an organization, it can also die there. As an 
organization’s environment changes and efforts are made to maintain competitive 
advantage, cost is generally the first area of focus. In most firms, cost is directly 
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proportional to head count, and therefore downsizing becomes the primary means of 
reducing expenses. Based on pure logic, however, when downsizing with cutting costs in 
mind, firms typically look to their highest paid workers as prime targets, often neglecting 
the fact that those higher salaries are tied to the amount of knowledge resident in that 
worker. As a result, firms often find themselves with significantly less intellectual capital 
after periods of layoffs and have done more damage than good to the organization as a 
whole. (Housel and Bell, 2001) 
Knowledge can also be privately owned. In today’s global economy where 
maintaining competitive advantage is essential to an organization’s survival, protection of 
privately held knowledge is more important now than it has ever been. Private, or 
proprietary, knowledge is what allows a firm to increase its wealth and maintain a 
foothold in the market place. It is not readily available to the public because it serves that 
particular organization’s interest and is tied directly to their ability to remain competitive. 
Today, however, there are very few concepts and ideas that remain unique to an 
organization and are not generally available. As technology has made it easier and easier 
to mass-produce goods of like design and quality, companies are making increased 
efforts to ensure that proprietary knowledge remains private. Companies such as Coca-
Cola, whose formula remains a trade secret even today, are rare (Davenport and Prusak, 
1998). More often than not, we are seeing advantageous knowledge become readily 
available, such as what happened to Netscape’s ownership of internet browsing 
technologies in the 1990’s (Housel and Bell, 2001). 
The success of a knowledge intensive organization hinges on its ability to manage 
knowledge. Identifying and capturing tacit knowledge is often the most difficult task 
because in knowledge intensive environments it involves knowledge that is expressed as 
action-based skills that are difficult to reduce to rules and recipes. As personnel come and 
go, the need to maintain a stable knowledge base is equally important. For a knowledge 
intensive firm, reducing head count as a primary means of cost cutting will not 
necessarily produce the desired results if the primary knowledge base is cut as well. Like 
all organizations, those that are knowledge intensive must also develop new ways of 
implementing KM projects while ensuring their own longevity. 
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3. Knowledge Valuation 
An essential element of effective knowledge management is understanding how to 
measure its value. Knowledge intensive organizations are getting smarter as workers 
become empowered and encouraged to continuously learn. As more and more resources 
are committed to learning, management must find ways to capture the value of 
knowledge that is otherwise an intangible asset (Krishna, 2000).  However, this challenge 
is quite difficult since traditional methods of economic valuation are based on fixed, 
tangible assets that are measured as capital investments. The knowledge embedded within 
core processes, employee brains, patents and copyrights are key contributors to an 
organization’s competitive advantage. The effective measurement of these intangible 
assets has proven to be rather illusive. Today, with such intangible assets as the primary 
driver of corporate performance, assessing the investment in those resources has become 
even more crucial (Osterland, 2001). 
Throughout our literature review there was mention of several different 
approaches to the dilemma of knowledge valuation. Perhaps the best summary is offered 
by Housel and Bell (2001) in which the most prevalent approaches and assumptions are 



























Table 1. Methods of Knowledge Valuation 
 
With the general assumption that the deployment of a knowledge intensive 
organization’s knowledge assets centers on core processes, the “knowledge is 
proportional to value” approach seems most appropriate. In the framework of this 
approach, the explicit knowledge deployed within the organization’s processes is directly 
observable and common units of knowledge can be devised as surrogates to describe 
common units of process outputs (Housel and Bell, 2001).  In our case, for example, the 
explicit knowledge deployed throughout the assessment process can be observed and 
captured in specific, common units of measurement. Since knowledge is proportional to 
Method General Assumption What is Lacking 
Process of elimination Tangible and intangible 
assets can be separated. 
What is left is knowledge 
value 
Does not focus on 
common unit of 
measurement for analysis 
of knowledge across entire 
organization. 
It’s in here somewhere All encompassing 
approach that assumes the 
more indicators of 
intellectual capital you 
identify, the more 
complete your picture 
knowledge value is. 
Does not identify which 
indicators should be most 
important to the manager 
Everything is cost Assumes the value of 
knowledge can be 
measured by calculating its 
market price 
Market price does not 
directly translate to the 
value the knowledge 
creates 
Rorschach (Ink Blot) Assumes managers can 




Interpretation is left to 




Forget it Assumes it is impossible to 
develop meaningful 
measures since knowledge 
is intangible. Believes only 
the outputs of knowledge 
can be measured. 
Does not establish a 
specific relationship 
between knowledge used 
and presumed outputs. 
Knowledge is 
proportionate to value 
Assumes a direct 
relationship between 
knowledge and the value it 
creates. 
Does not identify the value 
embedded within creative 
knowledge assets 
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value, it logically follows that the amount of knowledge deployed throughout the CNVT 
processes can be measured in common units and these units are surrogates for the process 
outputs or the value of the process (Housel and Kanevsky, 1995). The upshot is that, 
through this approach, we should be able to objectively measure value through the 
amount of knowledge deployed in network assessment processes. 
4. The Role of IT 
As the new millennium begins to unfold, knowledge continues to play an 
increasingly important role in an organization’s strategy. The ramifications of confusing 
data, information and knowledge are becoming increasingly costly. Organizations have 
spent tremendous amounts of money on technology initiatives that have not delivered 
what was needed or promised (Davenport and Prusak, 1998). In today’s economy where 
nothing is guaranteed and all is virtually uncertain, the only “sure source of lasting 
competitive advantage is knowledge”(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Organizations are 
becoming more knowledge intensive in which continuous learning is encouraged and, in 
fact, a necessary must for an employee to be successful.  Take for example the Healthcare 
field. For years, healthcare professionals have trained to be able to recall and apply 
information pertaining to a specific illness. Now, with the influx of technology and global 
networking, they are required to manage more than just the knowledge within their own 
brains. They must also manage the internally generated knowledge about patients such as 
medical history and insurance information, as well as the knowledge made available 
through sharing across networks (Moore, 2002).  
The amount of information generated now by IT in the Healthcare community and 
the resulting knowledge it creates qualifies it as knowledge intensive. A similar 
conclusion can be drawn for Information Assurance professionals since the crux of their 
existence is knowledge of the fundamentals of IT, its many vulnerabilities, and the 
solutions to correct them. As knowledge intensive organizations grow, so too does the 
complexity of the knowledge they are required to manage. Such organizations must be 
able to integrate and share highly distributed knowledge to ensure effective performance 
and continued growth (Zack, 1999). With the advent of the intranet and various 
networking technologies, cross-organizational knowledge sharing is not uncommon. 
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Companies can now access cross-platform information from various locations worldwide 
via the internet (Krishna, 2000). With such technology facilitating the sharing of 
information, the problem of deciding how to effectively deploy IT in a knowledge 
management solution warrants attention as well. 
In understanding the role of IT in knowledge management, it should be 
emphasized that IT is an enabler rather than a driver (Krishna, 2000). Housel and Bell 
(2001) further highlight this by offering two fundamentals that, if followed, make moving 
knowledge assets to IT an advantageous endeavor. First, simple and procedural 
knowledge that is employed frequently should be moved to IT. Such tedious work as 
accounting, billing and basic manufacturing follows very specific rules. Moving this 
procedural knowledge to IT dramatically lowers the cost per usage of this knowledge. 
The second principle addresses one of the knowledge facets previously mentioned. 
Organizations should seek to capture in IT the knowledge that typically dies when an 
employee leaves the company. The critical complex knowledge that a worker has 
accumulated over years of experience is often essential to the continual smooth operation 
of the organization. Capturing it in IT ensures that the knowledge remains embedded 
throughout processes and is accessible to less experienced employees.  
B. BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING 
The concept of Business Process Reengineering is no longer new to organizations. 
Since the 1980’s tremendous investments in IT have yielded only marginal increases in 
productivity and performance. Some attribute this to the confusion between knowledge 
and information (Malhotra, 2000). Others claimed that measurements were too narrowly 
defined and could not be appropriately applied to a service economy. Another set of 
explanations claimed that IT itself was not implemented properly; that the user interfaces 
and software were not user friendly and that managers did not fully understand IT (El 
Sawy, 2001). After several more years of failed IT investments, corporate America began 
to shift its focus. No longer were they addressing non user-friendly IT issues. The focus 
shifted to organizational processes, structures and designs that were not work-friendly. 
They began to realize that their traditional organizational designs were contributing more 
to poor performance and productivity than poorly implemented IT systems. With that 
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realization, companies began to seek new ways of doing business with hopes of yielding 
tremendous increases in performance. The desire for more effective cost cutting, faster 
cycle times and better customer responsiveness, and the methods of getting there, became 
known as business process reengineering (El Sawy, 2001). 
There have been numerous publications on business process reengineering since 
the concept gained momentum in the early 1990’s. Two of the better-known works 
appeared simultaneously, focusing on the importance of business processes and how IT 
could be used as an innovation and transformation tool. The first was an article by 
Thomas Davenport and James Short. In what they refer to as “The new industrial 
engineering”, they define a recursive relationship between information technology and 
business processes. This relationship, depicted in Figure 1, essentially sates that one 
should think of information technology in terms of how it supports new or redesigned 
processes, rather than business functions. Recursively, business processes and 
improvements should be thought of in terms of the capabilities that information 











Figure 1. Recursive Relationship Between IT and BPR (From: Davenport and Short, 
1990) 
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The second work, an article by Michael Hammer, took a more radical approach to 
make the same argument. Rather than simply “webifying” or automating your old 
processes with IT, his message was to get rid of the old rules, begin anew with a clean 
slate and use IT to radically change the way your business is done. In essence, his 
approach sought to challenge the pre-existing assumptions inherent in the work process 
by forcing the notion of “discontinuous thinking” (Malhotra, 1998). Both approaches 
seek to redefine the way business is done through the use of IT and both have served as 
the foundation for the numerous BPR initiatives existing throughout corporate America 
today. Within the military and other organizations throughout DoD where operational 
capability must be maintained, Hammer’s approach is not always a feasible option in 
guiding process redesign efforts. Many DoD entities are governed by external agencies 
such as the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) and the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), or, in the case of Information Assurance, a myriad of 
policies and guidelines that must be followed, to ensure conformity with established laws. 
Therefore, radical change is particularly difficult on any scale. Additionally, established 
levels of readiness must be maintained throughout any type of reengineering processes. 
Maintenance of established levels of readiness and 
conformance with guidelines are measures used to evaluate DoD leadership. 
It is therefore difficult to convince commanders or leadership to conduct 
any type of reengineering effort that may be considered radical. 
1. BPR Defined 
Throughout our literature research, we were presented with several different 
definitions of business process reengineering. Despite the various flavors of BPR, the 
commonality is that the concept is more a process improvement philosophy whose 
primary focus is achieving improvements by rethinking and redesigning the execution of 
business processes (El Sawy, 2001).  
Davenport & Short (1990) define business processes as “a set of logically related 
tasks performed to achieve a defined business outcome”. Fundamentally, these processes 
have two important characteristics: they have customers and they span across 
organizational boundaries. Customers are the recipients of the business process outcomes 
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and can be internal or external to an organization. Business processes are generally 
independent of organizational structure and can occur across and within the 
organizational subunits. Furthermore, processes can be large scale, affecting the whole 
organization or group, or more detailed such as completing a quarterly billing statement. 
 El Sawy (2001) defines a business process as “a coordinated and logically 
sequenced set of work activities and associated resources that produce something of value 
to the customer”.  Along with the common theme of being cross organizational and 
customer based, he adds that there are several other properties fundamental to business 
processes. They create knowledge and information flow around the process. Business 
processes can exist in multiple versions rather than one size fits all. Lastly, the degree of 
structure of a process can vary from highly structured for process with well-defined steps, 
to loosely structured for those that include knowledge intensive work. Regardless of 
which definition is chosen, a process redesign initiative driven by IT can be applied. 
To fully illustrate how BPR fits into an organization, El Sawy uses the Leavitt 
Diamond.9 In short, it is a depiction that shows that it simply is not enough to just 
redesign processes. It should be understood that, in order to maintain a sense of balance 
and stability within the organizations, the environment around the processes might need 








Figure 2. Leavitt Diamond 
                                                 
9 Developed by H.J. Leavitt (1965), the diamond is used as an organizational model for illustrating the 











Figure 2 shows the Leavitt diamond, which presents a conceptual framework for 
balancing IT-enabled transformation. During a process redesign effort, when any of the 
four organizational variables is changed, the other three must be adjusted accordingly to 
ensure the organization maintains its functional harmony. As an example, if new 
information technology is introduced, business process will need to be adjusted to take 
advantage of it. As business processes change, newer people skills may be required to 
execute them, possibly resulting in a newer, more efficient organizational form (El Sawy, 
2001). Understanding such a framework is critically important when redesigning 
processes that are knowledge intensive. As processes change, creating the need for new 
people skills or organizational form, the knowledge about those processes changes as 
well. It either departs with outgoing personnel or becomes useless because it resides in 
the mind of a person who is no longer associated with the process. Thus when 
redesigning processes, it is imperative to ensure that the knowledge about the process is 
considered. 
2. BPR in Knowledge Management 
Since the Total Quality Management (TQM) era reached its peak in popularity in 
the early 1980’s the quest to improve an organization’s performance has gone through 
several phases. After TQM came what El Sawy calls the first wave of BPR, built on the 
principles of Davenport and Short’s “New Industrial Engineering” and Hammer’s “Don’t 
Automate, Obliterate” approach. As BPR transformation movements took place, the 
internet and the World Wide Web took off, eventually providing ubiquitous global 
connectivity and spawning the development of web-based business processes. 
Organizations began to redesign their processes to focus more on value chain 
management. As the next phase of BPR begins to unfold, the focus has shifted once 
again. With web technologies at the foundation of e-commerce, the knowledge creating 
capabilities of business processes is tremendous. As a result, organizational strategies and 
BPR efforts of today are centered on effectively managing the knowledge and value 
created by new processes. Table 2 summarizes the evolution of business process redesign 
efforts. As can be seen, the use of the internet as a core element of information 
technology infrastructure has facilitated the easy exchange of information and creation of 
knowledge around processes (El Sawy, 2001). As advances in technology continue to 
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spawn new knowledge creating capabilities in organizations, the challenge of harnessing 
the value of knowledge will become increasingly difficult. 
      Second-wave BPR 
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beyond 
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Table 2. Evolution of BPR 
 
3. BPR Principals 
Several principals of process redesign have been introduced and dominated BPR 
efforts since the concept’s inception.  Hammer argued that process redesign efforts 
should break away from the outdated rules that governed operations because they were 
based on assumptions about technology, people and organizational goals that were no 
longer true (Malhotra, 1998).  He proposed the following principals for process 
reengineering: (a) Organize around outcomes, not tasks; (b) have those who use the 
output of the process perform the process; (c) Subsume information-processing work into 
the real work that produces the information; (d) Treat geographically dispersed resources 
as though they were centralized; (e) Link parallel activities instead of integrating their 
results; (f) Put the decision point where the work is performed; (g) Capture information 
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once and at the source. While Hammer’s principles are appropriate for organizations that 
are prepared to embark on such an all-or-nothing journey, they offer no middle ground 
for firms that are bounded by external constraints or lack the time and resources to 
commit to such radical redesign. 
In taking a much broader view, Davenport and Short (1990) propose principals 
that view IT as more than just an automating force. As illustrated in their recursive 
relationship (Figure 1), IT should provide capabilities to support business processes, and 
business processes should be in terms of what IT can provide. They propose a five-step 





















Figure 3. Five-Step Redesign Process (From: Davenport and Short, 1990) 
Five Steps in Process Redesign 
Develop Business Vision and Process Objectives 
• Prioritize objectives and set stretch targets 
Identify Processes to Be Redesigned 
• Identify critical or bottleneck processes 
Identify IT Levers 
• Brainstorm new process approaches 
Understand and Measure Existing Processes 
• Identify current problems and set baseline 
Design and Build a Prototype of the Process 
• Implement organizational and technical aspects 
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An important point to highlight is that in identifying processes to be redesigned, 
the means by which processes are identified is critical. Since managers typically do not 
think of their business operations in terms of processes, this is often the most difficult 
step. Two major approaches are proposed: exhaustive and high impact. The exhaustive 
approach is generally the lengthiest, and often results in the most failures, because it 
attempts to identify all processes within an organization and prioritize them based on 
redesign urgency. Companies that have pursued this approach generally have not had the 
resources to address all of the identified processes. The high impact approach identifies 
only the most important processes or only those that are in the most conflict with the 
business strategy and objectives. This approach is generally more successful than the 
exhaustive approach because most companies have fairly good sense of which processes 
are most crucial to their success or are not in alignment with their overall vision.  
With the continued broadening of the global economy and e-commerce quickly 
becoming a key pillar of enterprise business strategies, the redesign of processes for e-
business has developed as a key area of concern. In the e-business environment, the 
capabilities afforded by e-commerce are giving competitive advantage to those 
corporations willing to exploit its full potential. Furthermore, enterprise partners, 
suppliers, and customers are demanding the same e-business capabilities. To meet such 
increasing demands and maintain competitive advantage, organizations are scrambling to 
transform their processes. El Sawy (2001) calls this “the e-business speed loop” (Figure 
4) and uses it as a framework for developing a set of principles to guide enterprise 





















Figure 4. e-Business Speed Loop (From: El Saway, 2001) 
 
In the framework of the e-business speed loop, organizations have three sets of 
strategic capabilities that feed into each other, allowing them to compete and quickly 
exploit now opportunities offered by e-business. El Sawy offers ten redesign principles 
that enable quick execution of the strategic capabilities and encompasses all of the other 
redesign principles previously discussed:  
(1) Streamline – Remove waste, simplify and consolidate similar activities. 
(2) Lose Wait – Squeeze out waiting time in process links to create value. 
(3) Orchestrate – Let the swiftest and most able enterprise execute. 
(4) Mass-Customize – Flex the process for any time, any place, any way. 
(5) Synchronize – Synchronize the physical and virtual parts of the process. 
(6) Digitize and Propagate – Capture the information digitally and propagate 
it throughout the process. 
(7) Vitrify – Provide glass-like visibility through fresher and richer 
information about process status. 
(8) Sensitize – Fit the process with vigilant sensors and feedback loops that 
can prompt action. 
(9) Analyze and synthesize – Augment the interactive analysis and synthesis 




















(10) Connect, Collect, and Create – Grow intelligently reusable knowledge 
around the process through all who touch it. 
It is our belief that combining Davenport and Short’s five-step process with some 
of the key principles offered by El Sawy afford the best opportunity for a successful BPR 
initiative within the knowledge intensive context. An effective knowledge intensive 
organization is organized around tasks, rather than outcomes as proposed by Hammer. 
Furthermore, given the dynamic environment within which these organizations must 
operate, it is not always feasible to have those who benefit from the outputs of the 
processes actually perform the process. In Davenport and Short’s five-step proposal, 
objectives and major bottleneck processes are easy to identify. As such, existing 
problems should be highly visible making it easier to brainstorm for new process 
approaches.  
El Sawy’s, e-business speed loop most accurately depicts the nature of the 
environment in which knowledge intensive organizations operate. Within their enterprise 
processes, the three strategic capabilities must be constantly balanced with meeting the 
needs of stakeholders – customers, suppliers, competitors and partners. To maintain that 
state of balance, any reengineering effort must incorporate most, if not all, of the 
principles proposed by El Sawy. Our POC case will demonstrate how this can be done 
while increasing process capacity as well.  
4. Why BPR Fails 
Despite the existence of clearly defined guidelines and numerous models from 
which to follow, 70 percent of all BPR projects fail (Malhotra, 1998). The reasons for 
such failures vary, but from among different experts on the topic there are several 
recurring themes. The most common are lack of sustained management commitment and 
leadership, and resistance to change. In most redesign efforts, the processes to be 
redesigned cut across various parts of the organization. If the redesign effort is being 
driven by a single subunit within the organization, it will more than likely encounter 
some resistance from other parts of the organization. Without strong, visible commitment 
from senior leadership10, employees throughout the organization will not understand the 
                                                 
10 “It is often said that major change is impossible unless the head of the organization is an active 
supporter”  (Conger, et al.  1999.  p. 90). 
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critical nature of the redesign effort or the role of IT within process redesign, and the 
customer’s opinion as the recipient of the process output will be neglected.  
Unrealistic scope and expectations also continue to doom process-reengineering 
efforts. Most organizations take on BPR initiatives with the hopes of seeing immediate 
and dramatic improvements in productivity and performance. Where they fail is ensuring 
that the appropriate processes are identified and the correct measures are taken to 
redesign them. Companies are expending tremendous financial resources on enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) systems from various BPR vendors with the expectation that the 
systems will provide regimented sharing of data across various business functions 
(Malhotra, 2000). These systems focused primarily on coordination of the company’s 
internal functions. While they were successful at providing top-down data sharing within 
internal functions, the models were not scalable and did not allow for the multi-direction 
inter-organizational information flows with suppliers and customers needed to support e-
business functions.  
Some of the less prevalent but equally important causes of BRP failure are: too 
many projects under way; unsound financial position; not focusing on processes; 
spending too much time analyzing the current situation; ignoring concerns of your 
people; proceeding without strong executive leadership; over emphasis of the tactical 
aspects at the expense of strategic dimensions being compromised (Hammer and Stanton, 
1995; Bashein et al., 1994; King, 1994). 
There are, however, some tactics and preconditions that facilitate successful 
implementation of BPR initiatives. Bashein et al. (1994) outlines several preconditions 
for BPR successes: Senior management commitment; realistic expectations; empowered 
and collaborative workers; strategic context of growth and expansion; shared vision; 
sound management practices; full time participation of appropriate people. As the BPR 
initiative is implemented, there are several measures that leadership can take to help 
ensure it is done successfully. As with any organizational change, communication is 
critical. Management should communicate changes as clearly and succinctly as possible 
so that all involved have to same level of expectations. Anticipation of resistance, and 
appropriate measures to counter it, is an effective measure as well. Regular training 
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sessions to discuss new procedures or policy facilitates communication and ensures that 
all concerns are addressed, helping to combat resistance. Lastly, management should 
ensure that goals to be achieved and the metrics by which they are measured are 
unambiguous and clearly defined11.   
C. COMPUTER NETWORK VULNERABILITY TEAM 
The POC case examined in this thesis deals with finding a way to increase process 
capacity though objective measurement of value in the core processes of the NCPAC 
CNVT. The team’s success is directly dependent on its ability to effectively coordinate, 
plan, and execute missions. Doing so requires repeated refreshment and application of 
team members’ knowledge throughout the entire network assessment process. With 
increasing demand for the team’s services and the dynamic nature of the information 
assurance field, the NCPAC CNVT qualifies as a knowledge intensive organization that 
could benefit from more efficient knowledge management facilitated by application of 
business process reengineering principles and information technology. 
1. Overview 
CNVT’s purpose is to provide customers within the Pacific Command (PACOM) 
area of responsibility (AOR) the support necessary to “develop the best possible 
information system security posture through cooperative examination of their computer 
network systems. [This is done] through cooperative examination of their systems to 
identify and help counter vulnerabilities which could be exploited by an adversary” 
(CNVT Charter).  The CNVT currently consists of 4 permanent NSA team members and 
is normally augmented with information assurance specialists from the USPACOM’s 
Computer Network Defense and Information Assurance Division (J-65) and NSA’s 
Network Security Evaluations and Tools Division (C-44). The team conducts ten to 
fifteen network vulnerability assessments per year and is seeking ways to increase their 
process capacity in order to allow them to meet increased demand for their services. 
Generally, the team will employ the following typical network assessment techniques to 
evaluate the networks and hosts within an AOR: 
                                                 
11 In addition to preconditions for BPR discussed by Bashein, Conger, Spreitzer, and Lawler cite a list 
if eight steps to transforming an organization.  (Conger, et al, 1999. p.99)  
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• Examine network configurations and documentation and become familiar 
with the architecture of customer infrastructures   
• Examine and evaluate the Access Control configuration of perimeter 
routers and firewalls  
• Examine and evaluate the Access Control configuration of Remote Access 
Systems  
• Evaluate DMZ policies and configuration  
• Examine services provided to internal and external customers (web, email, 
file sharing, etc.)  
• Scan and evaluate key network servers and infrastructure devices  
• Scan and evaluate all hosts for network and operating system 
vulnerabilities  
• Verify latest patches and service packs are properly installed  
• Examine password policies  
• Evaluate physical security 
2. IA 
To be successful at the mission specified in their charter, team members must 
keep their knowledge current in the dynamic world of Information Assurance.  Advances 
in technology require that members be aware of vulnerabilities and be familiar with 
associated remedies to ensure sustained security and IA.  The ever-increasing automation, 
speed, and sophistication of network attack tools12 warrants having Subject Matter 
Experts (SME) in network security.  The threat to DoD network infrastructures is 
constant and requires regular refreshment of knowledge.  Therefore, the knowledge 
resident within the team must be constantly updated.  The CNVT is where the knowledge 
concerning IA resides, as they are the Pacific COCOM’s group of network security 
SME.s.      
Recognizing the immense challenges of maintaining IA, the DoD has issued a 
number of directives focused on ensuring data and Information Systems are secure.  
Entities such as the CNVT are created and relied upon to meet the requirements of laws 
and directives such as the Title 10, United States Code, Section 224, which establishes 
                                                 
12 Department of Defense brief on “Safety and Security Extensions to iCMM and CMMI” 20 June 
2002. 
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the requirement for a Defense Information Assurance Program, and the DoD Directive 
8500 series, which establishes policy and assigns responsibilities to achieve IA within 
DoD infrastructures. 
  New operating systems13, applications, connection media and increases in 
connection speeds, usage of satellite assets (both owned or leased), wireless peripherals, 
and automation advancements in general require constant education.  The characteristics 
of IA, constant change and a multitude of sub processes that require expertise, make it a 
knowledge intensive process.  As such, the CNVT, and entities like it, are all groups that 
can benefit from an applied methodology that helps increase process capacity within 
knowledge intensive organizations.   
3. Stakeholders 
There are several stakeholders in CNVT’s network assessment process who 
continually influence its “e-business speed loop” (El Sawy, 2001). They range from the 
customers within the PACOM AOR, who are the most direct recipients of CNVT’s 
process outputs, to the Combatant Commander who has the added assurance of knowing 
his networks are secure. Other stakeholders include but are not limited to: 
• NSA’s Network Security Evaluations and Tool Division – provides 
augmentation personnel for CNVT missions. Gain real world experience 
from mission planning and execution. 
• USPACOM’s Computer Network Defense and Information Assurance 
Division – provides augmentation personnel for CNVT missions. Gain 
real world experience from mission planning and execution. 
• US Naval Postgraduate School Information Warfare Program - provides 
augmentation personnel for CNVT missions. Allow students to gain real 
world experience from mission planning and execution. Provide thesis 
opportunity for topics related to Information Assurance. 
                                                 
13 The SANS Institute cites that the majority of successful attacks on operating systems come from 
only a few software vulnerabilities.  Operating System vulnerabilities are the most exploited weaknesses by 
hackers because attackers are opportunistic, take the easiest and most convenient route, and exploit the 
best-known flaws with effective and widely available tools.  These flaws are also the easiest to address and 
fix by applying updated patches.  (SANS Institute Web site.  www.SANS.org). 
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• USPACOM’s Information Operations Division – provide funding 
assistance for CNVT missions in direct support of USPACOM operational 
objectives. 
The Area of Responsibility covered by the CNVT extends from Japan to the 
entire West Coast of the United States and includes every point in between.  It covers all 
geography within the Pacific, Arctic, and Indian Oceans and reaches North to include 
Alaska and South to include Australia. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The review of relevant literature suggests that management of knowledge within 
an organization is critical to survival in today’s global economy. Like other for-profit 
organizations that rely on knowledge to maintain competitive advantage, DoD relies on 
organizational knowledge to maintain an advantage in the Information Assurance arena. 
However, unlike other organizations, this advantage is not tied directly to the ability to 
garner more market share or generate more sales revenue. Rather, it is tied to the ability 
to effectively provide service, support, and security of its information networks. Based on 
this understanding, and the needs identified throughout the literature review, the 
following primary and secondary research questions will be addressed: 
1. Primary 
a) Can the Capacity of Knowledge Intensive Processes Be Increased 
by Applying BPR and Knowledge Management Principles?  
2. Secondary 
a) Is There a Way to Objectively Measure the Value of Knowledge 
Deployed Within Knowledge-Intensive Processes? 
b) Can Repeatable Processes Be Automated or Outsourced to 
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III. MEASURING THE RETURN ON KNOWLEDGE 
This chapter describes a theory and methodology for estimating return on 
knowledge14 that uses knowledge in people and technology as a way to describe process 
output in common units and also treats process outputs as value. The return on 
knowledge is captured by: (1) measuring the amount of knowledge used in a process to 
produce outputs, and (2) measuring the costs incurred in acquiring and applying this 
knowledge to produce these process outputs. The result is a common unit of knowledge 
that is a surrogate for common units of process output across the entire organization and a 
relationship of knowledge to value that helps resolve the question of how much value that 
knowledge provides to the organization. (Housel and Bell, 2001). 
A. THEORY 
As previously mentioned, there have been numerous approaches to measuring the 
value of knowledge, each replete with their own strengths and weaknesses. Among them, 
the commonality is that none offer the manager a means of objectively measuring 
knowledge and its value across the entire organization. These methods of valuation rely 
on traditional financial indicators that do little to link knowledge to sub-corporate 
measures of performance (Strassman, 1999). Furthermore, these traditional methods 
neglect to incorporate information and the knowledge provided by IT into the 
performance metrics that are used by decision makers.  
1. Knowledge Value Added 
The Knowledge Value Added (KVA) methodology will be used in this thesis as a 
method of capturing the value of explicit knowledge within a knowledge intensive 
organization. The method, developed by Drs. Thomas J. Housel and Valery Kanevsky, 
provides a means for objective measurement of the relationship between knowledge and 
the value it produces in organizational processes and falls into the “knowledge is 
proportional to value” framework discussed in the literature review. By translating 
knowledge utilized into numerical form, KVA allows corporations to allocate revenue in 
                                                 
14 For our purposes, Knowledge can be defined as a conceptual (ideational) construct generated 
through the agency of the human mind.  (Housel and Bell, 2001)  It is a surrogate for the process outputs 
measured in common units. 
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proportion to the amount of value added by knowledge (Housel and Bell, 2001). This 
methodology also proves beneficial to non-profit organizations because it presupposes 
knowledge as a surrogate for value and therefore can be used independent of profit 
generation. For this reason, and because cutting costs and reducing head count were not 
viable options for our proof of concept, KVA was chosen because it enables managers to 
measure the performance of corporate knowledge assets whether the knowledge is 
deployed in IT or resident within employees’ heads. The methodology provides an 
aggregation of knowledge contributions within specific processes and indicates to 
decision makers areas in which efforts to increase productivity could be focused rather 
than simply focusing on cutting costs. The underlying assumptions of the KVA model are 
















Figure 5. Fundamental Assumptions of KVA (From: Housel and Bell, 2001) 
 
The fundamental assumptions are where KVA derives its validity as a knowledge 
measurement method. It logically follows that if a process produces an output that is 
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different from an input, then that change is proportional to the amount of value resident 
within the process, assuming the changes produce the correct output. If we have 
knowledge of the process that is necessary to produce the change, then we have the 
amount of change introduced by the knowledge (Housel and Bell, 2001). The resulting 
conclusion is that knowledge and change are proportional and can be used as surrogates 
for value when assessing process units of output. The utility to managers is that the 
output of all processes becomes standardized in terms of the units of knowledge required 
to produce it. 
2. Approaches to KVA 
What makes KVA an attractive approach is that the method is simple enough to 
be applied in seven steps yet it is robust enough to produce a desired level of granularity 
should managers desire a more comprehensive view of organizational processes. Housel 
and Bell (2001) offer three different ways to establish the value of knowledge embedded 
in the firm’s core processes. Each is summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3. Three Approaches to KVA (From Housel and Bell, 2001) 
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B. KVA METHOD 
Although the binary query method is generally the most accurate, it is also the 
most time consuming and primarily reserved for situations requiring a high degree of 
accuracy and granularity. The method of analysis for our Proof of Concept is the 
Learning Time method. This method allows those who use it to establish rough-cut 
estimates of the value of knowledge within processes. It can be accomplished more 
quickly than the binary query method and is targeted at the aggregate level of analysis. 
An example of a high-level aggregate KVA analysis is shown in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4. High-level Aggregate KVA Analysis (From Housel and Bell, 2001) 
 
Table 4 shows the results of a seven step high-level KVA analysis of Exodus 
Communications15 1999 performance. Immediately, managers are able to see the relative 
performance of core functional areas in terms of ROK. The results serve as a launching 
point from which a more detailed KVA analysis can be done to identify knowledge 
deployed in sub-processes and to help managers make better decisions on how to make 
the company more profitable. 
 
                                                 
15 Exodus Communications is an Internet data center company that was founded in 1994. The 




1. Learning Time 
Due to time constraints and limited access to CNVT personnel, it was determined 
that the Learning Time method would be used. In this method, the amount of knowledge 
embedded in a process is represented as the amount of time necessary for an average 
person to learn how to correctly execute that process. Since we are unable to compare 
results to those of the process description or binary query method, we used correlation 
between ordinal rankings, relative learn time (RLT) and actual learn time (ALT) to 
determine the reliability of the estimate. The three terms are described below: 
• Ordinal Rank - is a measure of the firm’s core processes in terms of 
difficulty to learn. Executives within the company are asked to rank core 
processes from hardest to easiest or most to least complex to learn (Housel 
and Bell, 2001).  
• Relative Learn Time – a measure of the time it takes to learn each process 
relative to 100 months. Given 100 months total time to learn every core 
area, executives are asked to estimate how long it would take the average 
person to learn how to correctly execute each core process. 
• Actual Learn Time – is an estimate of the real world learning time for the 
average person to learn each core processes. There are no limitations 
regarding total time allotted as in the RLT figure.  
Using these values, the goal is to obtain a correlation figure of .8 or higher. A 
lesser figure would indicate that management is perhaps not using a common reference 
point for estimation and our estimates are therefore inaccurate (Housel and Bell, 2001). 
The final part of the initial analysis is to get an accurate count of the number of 
times knowledge is executed during the sampling period and the time it takes to execute. 
These figures are representative of value and cost, respectively (International Engineering 
Consortium KVA tutorial). For our Proof of Concept, these figures are represented as 
“times fired”, head count and work time (WT). To help ensure accuracy of knowledge 
estimates, it is important to note that two basic rules be followed. First, to avoid 
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overestimation, knowledge should be counted only when in use16. Secondly, to obtain the 
















                                                 
16 Tutorial on Knowledge Value-Added Methodology.  Web ProForum Tutorials.  The International 
Engineering Consortium.  (p. 6) 
 37
IV. DATA COLLECTION 
This section provides the supporting research data for our POC and shows how 
we used the KVA methodology to capture the value added within a knowledge intensive 
process; specifically, our POC.  The core processes involved in the planning and 
execution of a NCPAC CNVT network assessment will be examined, cradle to grave. 
This chapter discusses the rationale and explains the methods of gathering information 
and data used to develop and support this concept.  The objective and scope of data 
collection are also addressed.    
A. OBJECTIVE 
Data collection is focused on obtaining appropriate information that will answer 
the research questions.  Here we will explain how that data was collected.  The valuation 
of the knowledge associated with the processes identified during our data collection will 
serve to identify opportunities for increased returns. The questions posed revolve around 
increasing the capacity of knowledge intensive processes.  Capacity in this venue refers 
to allowing more room/time to provide more services to customers and stakeholders.  
This includes training for team members on new technologies, addressing high priority 
issues without largely impacting an existing schedule, or providing input for establishing 
network security/IA guidance and policies for the COCOM.  
B. SCOPE 
The Scope of our Data Collection efforts was limited to the CNVT Assessment 
Process.  The actual assessment process exists to identify IA weaknesses and network 
vulnerabilities and help harden activities within the PACOM AOR against IA threats.  
Within DoD, assessment teams are assigned the missions of ensuring commands are 
compliant with IA security directives and that administrators are educated in maintaining 
secure, stable infrastructures17.  When performing an assessment, team members use 
similar attack techniques and information gathering tools that attackers use to fingerprint 
and enumerate remote targets.  Again, capabilities and thoroughness can be constrained 
by local command guidelines or real-world situational requirements.   
                                                 
17 Title 10, United Stated Code, Section 224. 
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Assessments can be performed either internal or external to the network but the 
processes remain the same.  The primary goal of an external assessment is to determine 
what sensitive information attackers might obtain by probing the network (Northcut, et al.  
2003).  An internal assessment looks at permissions and requires the administrators to test 
the configurations of perimeter components to verify security. Assessment personnel 
must keep pace with the fluid and knowledge intensive field of IA to ensure continuity of 
security.  Although the scope of our data collection was focused on an IA assessment 
process, the concepts and lessons that can be drawn from our case are generic and can be 
applied to any knowledge intensive process.   
C. COLLECTION METHODOLOGY 
1. CNVT Process Audit 
In our literature review, we concluded that process reengineering for a knowledge 
intensive organization could be accomplished by combining the fundamentals of 
Davenport and Short’s five-step process with some of El Sawy’s BPR principles. To 
begin the task of reengineering the CNVT’s processes, we conducted interviews, traveled 
with the team during assessments to do process audits, and researched DoD policies and 
directives.  The interviews and process audits served two purposes, which facilitated the 
completion of the first two steps of the five-step process; (1) to ensure we knew the 
CNVT concerns, and (2) to identify and validate existing processes. Members of the team 
repeatedly stated that their success was based on the quality of their product (assessment 
and guidance) and how they approached problems. They realized that they must maintain 
and keep track of automation advances in order to maintain a high level of knowledge 
(output to the customer). However, their operational tempo does not always allow for 
refreshment of knowledge. A recurring theme among the team members was that 
customer demand was increasing to the point that the team would not be able to provide 
service or an assessment.18  From these concerns we were ultimately able to identify the 
need to increase CNVT process capacity and make better use of the limited knowledge 
assets inherent to the team as the objectives of this process redesign initiative. 
                                                 
18 Meeting between PACOM CNVT and NPS team dated 29 August 2002. 
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Process audit data was collected during on-site assessments conducted in Korea 
and Hawaii.  Both events proved extremely beneficial in identifying which processes 
were to be redesigned. We were able to see first hand, from the perspective of the CNVT 
member and the customer, where bottlenecks and inefficient practices hampered the 
network assessment process. By interviewing the Subject Matter Experts (SME’s), 
CNVT members, and making observations, we were able to identify major processes and 
then break them down into sub processes where we identified respective inputs and 
outputs. Insight into augmentee contributions was observed as well, and interactions with 
clients were noted.     
2. AS-IS Process 
Information collected during interviews and observations during on site 
assessments enabled us to assess CNVT processes and build a model of the CNVT major 
processes.  By interviewing the Subject Matter Experts, CNVT members, and making 
observations, we were able to recognize major processes and then break them down into 
sub processes where we identified respective inputs and outputs. The purpose was to 
establish the boundaries between processes and sub-processes and ultimately use the 
KVA methodology to identify and valuate the knowledge required for each. Our baseline 
“AS-IS” process model (Figure 6) was discovered to be relatively straightforward.  The 
CNVT assessment process is comprised of the six core processes described below.  Each 
core process requires a certain level of knowledge, and includes requirements for 
knowledge in IA, administration, and management.   An interesting observation of their 
processes is that they lacked any notable usage of IT outside of the actual assessment 
process, other than normal office administrative functions such as email, word processing 
and spreadsheet usage.   
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Figure 6. “As-Is” Process Model 
 
a)  Request Handling 
In request handling, the call for customers goes out or calls for service are 
received and prioritized.  Initial, very limited information about the customer is compiled 
and passed to the CNVT for their review.  Legal Administration is also notified of a 
potential assessment.  The purpose is to ensure that customers acknowledge CNVT 
assessment intrusion and provide protection for CNVT members should any legal issues 
arise.  Sub-processes were identified as: 
• Prioritize 
• Request Report 
• Compile Information 












• Legal Administration 
The request handling is largely managed by the PACOM, J39 
(Information Operations Department).  J39 prioritization is done based on PACOM goals, 
arising IA threats, and team availability19.  This is the major point of entry for requesting 
an assessment. 
b) Information Gathering 
Information gathering is where the team sends out initial questionnaires 
and makes contact with potential commands to be assessed. Information concerning a 
command’s network topology and infrastructure are requested and analyzed.  Points of 
contact are also established and dialogues are created between customers and the team 
members. The CNVT questionnaire is attached as Appendix A. Sub-processes within 
information gathering were: 
• Send Questionnaire or Survey 
• Process Information 
The use of e-mail, phone conversations, and facsimiles are the most 
common methods for conducting information gathering.  Unless already stated, the goals 
of the assessment from the customer perspective are stated by the command and analyzed 
by the team.   
c) Mission Development and Scope 
The mission is developed from the preliminary information gathered from 
the customer combined with any specific COCOM IA goals.  The preliminary 
information is taken, analyzed, and used to determine what expertise is required, help 
estimate the team size and requirement for augments20, identify any particular hardware 
or software, and recognize any specific external resources that may be needed.  The Sub-
processes are: 
• Funding 
• Define Team Requirements 
• Scoping 
• Identification of augment requirements 
                                                 
19 Phonecon between PACOM J39, CNVT members, and NPS Team members dated 7 October 2002. 
20 Augments to the CNVT include assets from the NSA C44 Network Security Evaluations and Tools 
Division, PACOM J65 Computer Network Defense/Information Assurance Division, and NPS Monterey. 
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• Legal approval 
The determination as to whether or not an assessment can be done is based 
on inputs from Legal Administration and the availability of resources (funding or 
personnel).   Legal issues may include a command conducting a classified exercise or a 
real world event21.  Funds may not always be available and the command being assessed 
does not usually provide funding. 
d) Logistics and Travel Planning 
  The trip planning and logistics of the mission are developed from the 
development and scoping of the mission.  Travel arrangements include making 
reservations for vehicles, plane tickets, or hotels and ensuring travel orders are prepared 
and routed.  Requests for Security clearance are generated and routed through the 
headquarters sections and out to the customer for concurrence.  The logistics covers 
everything from ensuring augment orders are funded to making sure equipment is in line 
with the identified topology of the customer infrastructure.  Sub-processes include: 
• Ensure augments are identified 
• Generation of travel orders 
• Generation of and distribution of itinerary 
• Points of Contact identified and contacted 
• Any Legal issues resolved and completed 
• Hardware prepared 
• Security clearances completed 
• Any special equipment identified and prepared to travel 
• Customer network schematics and topology studied 
Strategy meetings for each assessment are held to ensure responsibilities 
are known and understood.  The mission lead is identified and any last minute details are 
addressed22.   
e) Network Assessment 
The network assessment is the meat of the CNVT assessment process.  It 
is here that the team interacts daily with and performs services for the customer.  The 
                                                 
21 During an assessment of the 516th Signal Brigade, UASRPAC, in Ft. Shafter, HI, the CNVT team 
and J65 personnel were restricted from doing any penetration testing due to circumstances surrounding 
Operations Iraqi Freedom and the War on Terrorism.  USPACOM CNVT  Assessment 3-11 April 2003.   
22 The team lead for the assessment at Ft. Shafter was a representative from the PACOM J6 
Department. 
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team lead makes the major decisions from the beginning in-brief to the out-brief and 
consolidates recommended corrective action.  The team responsibilities are distributed 
based on the structure of the network.  Members are assigned areas of focus based on 
their expertise.  For example, the member with network architecture expertise will be    
assigned the task of mapping the network and testing for vulnerabilities at the connection 
peripherals.  Assessment Sub-processes are: 
• In-Brief 
• Equipment Set-up 
• Assessment 
• Out-Brief 
The in-brief ranges from very formal to simple and informal and can 
address the entire staff or focus on the network personnel.  Set-up and connection of 
equipment usually takes the better part of the first day.  Access and permissions are 
enabled and passwords are assigned.  The assessment portion is client dependent and is 
built around the goals of the mission as identified by the customer and considered by the 
team lead.  The procedures are based on the team expertise present and are limited by any 
guidelines or restrictions placed on the team by the customer or higher headquarters.  The 
usage of tools or particular methods is again expertise dependent. 
The data is collected and a list of recommended corrective actions is 
generated.  Various strengths and weaknesses are identified and documented.  To 
conclude the assessment, an out-brief is given to highlight the most critical issues and 
provide positive feedback as well as identify areas to be improved with recommendations 
on how to effect changes. The data collected is consolidated and transported back to 
garrison with the team lead.  
f) Report Generation 
The final major process closes the cycle and provides captured data with 
interpretations to the customer.  This data includes any discovered vulnerabilities, DoD 
directive or policy non-compliance, recommendations for corrective actions, team or 
command concern, and any positives noted.  Sub-processes include: 
• Compilation of output 
• Review of the output and data analysis 
• Recommendations and validation 
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• Actual consolidation of data and writing of the report 
• Team concurrence 
• Higher Headquarters approval for release 
• Report sent to the assessed command 
The report generation is completely centralized and managed from the 
team lead hands.  Revisions are routed manually or via Secure Internet Protocol Routing 
Network (SIPRNET)23 and include comments for augments as well as core team 
members.  Actual delivery dates are dependent upon workload, operational tempo, and 
access to augmentees who may not be co-located.  The final reports usually take 30-55 
days before final delivery to customer is complete.   
3. Ordinal Rankings 
Having identified the core processes, we next compiled an ordinal ranking of the 
difficulty to learn each process. These are the subjective rankings of the processes 
ordered from what is perceived as least difficult (1) to most difficult (6) to learn. The 
ranking method serves as a baseline analysis that gives an initial perception as to which 
processes were least and most knowledge intensive. Each team member, including the 
J39 representative, was asked to rank the processes mentioned above.  Table 5 shows the 
results:   
Process: Ordinal Ranking  
Request Handling 1 
Logistics 2 
Information Gathering 3 
Report Generation 4 
Mission Development and Scope 5 
Network Assessment 6 
Table 5. Ordinal Rankings 
                                                 
23 Although raw data may be unclassified, the consolidation of data may allow the construction of a 
command’s network topology and identifies vulnerabilities that could serve as access points for attackers.  
Once consolidated, the information becomes classified. 
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The rankings serve as a benchmark that depicts the perceptions of the SME’s as to 
which processes are the most demanding to accomplish.   
4. Relative Learn Times 
The relative learn time of a process is the amount to time it takes for an average 
person to learn how to do a process correctly.  By documenting the relative learn times of 
each process, we get a common scale to measure against whether it is days, weeks, 
months, or years.  Given 100 months, the SME’s decide what time it would take to learn 
each respective process.  The RLT’s are cited in Table 6 below: 
   
Process: Relative Learn Time (Hrs) 
Request Handling 5 
Logistics 10 
Information Gathering 10 
Report Generation 20 
Mission Development and Scope 25 
Network Assessment 30 
Table 6. Relative Learn Times 
 
Intuitively, the process that is the most difficult should (and does) have the 
highest RLT. 
5. Actual Learn Times 
The ALT is the SME estimation on how long it actually took to learn a given 














Table 7. Actual Learn Times 
 
The Network Assessment has the highest ALT.  In this case it correlates with 
having the highest RLT and being the most difficult process to learn based on the team 
member ordinal ranking. 
6. Percent Information Technology 
The percent IT represents the amount of IT that is used in each of the processes.  
Since interviews revealed that IT usage was minimal during the “administrative” type 
processes, we estimate that only a small portion of completing those particular processes 
is attributable to automation. For the remaining processes, significantly more IT is used 
and is reflected in the percent automation, as shown in Table 8: 
Process: Percent Automation 
Request Handling 5 
Logistics 5 
Information Gathering 5 
Report Generation 20 
Mission Development and Scope 5 
Network Assessment 75 
Table 8. Percent Automation 
 
Process: ALT (HRS) 
Request Handling 8 
Logistics 80 
Information Gathering 8 
Report Generation 32 
Mission Development and Scope 120 
Network Assessment 960 
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The percent automaton estimates will be used in our KVA analysis to capture the 
value of knowledge that is deployed in IT. While it is intuitive that process completion 
depends heavily on the knowledge of the people executing it, if process completion also 
involves the use of IT, then a portion of the knowledge required to execute that process is 
in use within IT. Percent automation of IT allows us to capture those units of knowledge 
used in IT. 
7. Cost Estimation 
Cost estimation is the consolidation of Hourly cost for personnel and IT cost. 
Total cost is a summation of the two.  The hourly cost is a rough estimation and is based 
on the average annual salary of a Department of Defense GS-14 employee.  Since 
administrative uses of IT were deemed negligible, IT costs were estimated based on 
hardware and software costs that were CNVT specific. We estimated one fully 
configured laptop per team member (5 team members total) at an average cost of $2000 
per laptop to yield a base cost of $10,000 per year.  Spread across the CNVT average of 
15 assessments per year yielded an average of $666 per visit.  The individual IT costs for 



















Process: Costs ($) 
 Hourly IT Cost Total  
Cost 
Request Handling 320 19 339 
Logistics 7200 285 7485 
Information Gathering 480 19 499 
Report Generation 2880 114 2994 
Mission Development and Scope 1600 38 1638 
Network Assessment 8,000 190 8190 
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8. Assumptions 
Due to time limitations resulting in a short evaluation period and difficulties 
involved in coordination brought about by operational tempo, we were required to make 
several assumptions to enhance our understanding of the CNVT process.  Assumptions 
are not preferred but the effects can be minimized as long as they remain consistent.  
Assumptions made were: 
a) Incorporation of J39 Estimates 
Since the J39 is most intimately familiar with the functions associated 
with the “Request Handling” process, we used their input for ALT, and WT for this 
process.  The numbers differed somewhat from that of the CNVT members based on 
perspective.  The J39 estimated ALT, and WT at 8, and 4 hours respectively.  The team 
members valuated the same times at 4, and 2 hours respectively.  The point of view is 
subjective and based on differences in perceptions between the entity that actually does 
the function and the personnel who merely observe and receive the output.  ALT and WT 
estimations from the J39 were included to give us a more complete representation of the 
times involved in completing the assessment process. Our confidence in these estimations 
remains fairly high since the correlation24 numbers did not substantially change when 
incorporating the J39 estimates (Table 10). 
Correlation Using CNVT Team Input: Using J39 Input: 
Rank to RLT 97.9 % 97.9 % 
Rank to ALT 70.2 % 70.0 % 
RLT to ALT 72.1 % 71.9 % 
Table 10. Correlation of Estimates 
 
b) CNVT Member Salary 
The CNVT member salary input for Hourly cost was based on an 
estimated $40 per hour.  This equates to the annual salary of a GS-14.  The salaries were 
found to vary based on steps within the GS rating scale.  However, since each team 
member performed every process, we kept the salary static. Benefits associated with DoD 
                                                 
24 The level of correlation is an indication of the accuracy of the estimate (Housel and Bell, 2001). 
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employment (COLA, housing allowances, any travel pay, etc…) are not included since 
they are consistent and their inclusion would not affect the ROK relative final results. 
c) License Fees  
The CNVT receives application and software support from a variety of 
sources including NSA and the PACOM J6.  As such, we assumed that any software 
licensing fees particular to CNVT missions was negligible.  Additionally, many of the 
tools used by the team, such as L0phCrack, are free on the Internet.  Software such as 
Solar Winds, NetIQ or ISS is provided from support activities or is also used outside of 
the specific CNVT mission.  Finally, e-mail and any administrative tools are inherent to 


































V. DATA ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize our analysis of the data collected to 
answer the research questions 
A. “AS-IS” KVA ANALYSIS 
Table 11 depicts a summary of a high level KVA analysis of CNVT’s “as-is” 
processes. The entries of the table are summarized in the following paragraphs 




















Handling 5 8 4 2 5% 0.4 8.4 0.43% $19 $339 1.60% 
Logistics 10 80 60 3 5% 4 84 4.32% $285 $7,485 35.40% 
Information 
Gathering 10 8 4 3 5% 0.4. 8.4 0.43% $19 $499 2.36% 
Report 
generation 20 32 24 3 20% 6.4 38.4 1.97% $114 $2,994 14.16% 
Mission 
Development 25 120 8 5 5% 6 126 6.48% $38 $1,638 7.75% 
Network 
Assessment 30 960 40 5 75% 720 1680 86.37% $190 $8,190 38.73% 
Total 100 1208 140   737.2 1945 100.00% $666 $21,146 100.00% 
Table 11. High-level “As-Is” KVA Analysis 
 
The core processes, RLT, ALT, Work Time and percent automation numbers 
were all obtained through data collection and described in the previous chapter. As such, 
their meanings will not be discussed further in this section. Rather than include a column 
for ordinal ranking, processes are listed in relative order of difficulty to learn.  
1. Head Count 
Head Count is representative of the number of people involved in completing a 
process. This number is an estimation based on interviews with CNVT members and 
others associated with the overall assessment process. Accounting for the number of 
employees gives a general idea of how often knowledge (K) is used and provides a 
rough-cut way of weighing the cost of using knowledge in the processes over the 
evaluation period (Housel and Bell, 2001).    
2. Knowledge Allocation 
In conducting a KVA analysis, if the degree of correlation between RLT and ALT 
is high enough, either estimate can be used in calculating ROK. For our POC case, we 
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used the ALT estimate for our calculations. Since the units of knowledge in ALT are only 
fired once in completing a process, ALT is also representative of the amount of people 
knowledge (not depicted) used in each process.  The amount of K in IT is determined by 
multiplying the amount of people K in each process by the percent attributable to 
automation. Therefore, total K is the summation of people K and amount of K in IT. This 
approach is used when the K in people and IT is not redundantly used to produce process 
outputs. 
With total K calculated and represented as a common unit of measurement (based 
on 100 months relative learn time), a for-profit knowledge intensive organization would 
then be able to allocate revenue to each process based on the percentage of knowledge 
used in generating revenue. For DoD organizations, where knowledge execution does not 
result in generated revenue, knowledge allocation would give managers a better picture 
of where their most productive knowledge assets are deployed. While this doesn’t give 
the complete picture of where the most “bang for the buck” is, it does provide us with the 
numerator of our overall return on knowledge equation. 
3. Cost Allocation 
Hourly cost (depicted in Data Collection) is equal to the work time multiplied by 
the head count and the hourly salary for each employee. As previously discussed, hourly 
salary was roughly estimated at $40/hour and IT costs are based on an annualized cost of 
computer hardware for each CNVT member, with software costs being negligible. As in 
our calculations for total K, total cost is a summation of hourly cost and IT cost. 
With total cost calculated, we are able to further allocate costs to each core 
process based on a percentage. The unique manner in which KVA identifies costs enables 
managers to separate human labor costs from those associated with IT. This provides 
useful insight in that they are able to see which processes consume the most resources 
(cost) and have the biggest impact on their overall bottom-line.  
4. Return on Knowledge 







K Total Cost ROK 
Request Handling 8.4 $339 2.48% 
Logistics 84 $7,485 1.12% 
Information Gathering 8.4 $499 1.68% 
Report generation 38.4 $2,994 1.28% 
Mission Development 126 $1,638 7.69% 
Network Assessment 1680 $8,190 20.51% 
Total 1945 $21,146 9.20% 
 
Table 12. “As-Is” Return on Knowledge 
 
As can be immediately seen, the four processes that CNVT members deemed the 
easiest to learn in terms of relative difficulty are generating the least returns on 
knowledge. Request handling, logistics, information gathering and report generation all 
produce returns of less than 3% while the most return is realized in the network 
assessment process. At the aggregate level, the current processes only generate an ROK 
of 9.2%. The results are not surprising since CNVT members attribute a significantly 
larger portion of actual learn time to network assessment than the other processes. 
However, analysis of this table extends beyond the obvious ROK numbers. Costs of those 
processes generating little return should also be of equal importance to managers of 
knowledge intensive organizations and should prompt them to consider why a costly 
process generates such little return. Logistics, for example, is nearly as costly as the 
network assessment process, yet generates significantly less return on knowledge. On the 
converse, one might consider what enables a high cost process such as Network 
Assessment to generate such a high return.  
5. Return on IT 


















Table 13. Return on IT 
 
Like return on knowledge, return on IT shows similar results. As expected, the 
processes which were automated the most show the most amount of knowledge in use 
within IT and, a priori, the most return on IT. Inferences to be drawn from this table are 
similar to those that were drawn from the ROK table. 
B. REENGINEERING CORE PROCESSES 
In considering the results of the KVA analysis of the “as-is” processes and the 
descriptions of core processes as defined by CNVT members, it becomes apparent that 
the organization is plagued with problems related to inefficient information flow and 
ineffective knowledge management. In particular, the most immediately recognizable 
problems are described below: 
• Information flow about processes is rudimentary. From compiling the 
prioritization list for assessments to gathering information about 
customers, it seems as though the “stubby pencil” and sneaker-net 
techniques are the prevailing methods of communication.  
• Indirect access to available knowledge. With exception of being mission 
leads, CNVT members have little direct access to information about the 
command being assessed until the mission planning starts 
• Knowledge sharing coordination. Again, the sneaker-net prevails. There is 




K in IT IT Cost ROIT 
Request Handling 0.4 $19 2.10% 
Logistics 4 $285 1.40% 
Information Gathering 0.4 $19 2.10% 
Report generation 6.4 $114 5.61% 
Mission Development 7 $38 15.77% 
Network Assessment 720 $190 378.38% 
Total 737.2 $666 110.69% 
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representative. Furthermore, there is no centralized location for 
information to reside and enable visibility to all involved in the network 
assessment process. Other than face-to-face encounters, all parties 
involved, including the CNVT customers, must rely on email and phone 
calls as the primary means of coordination and collaboration.  
Each of these problem areas contributes significantly to the relatively low returns 
on knowledge and IT highlighted in the KVA analysis. They are conducive to increased 
process completion times, which directly results in higher costs and decreased capacity. 
Even more critical, these problems highlight the fact that most knowledge deployed 
throughout CNVT’s processes is resident within team member’s heads and that there is 
no mechanism in place to facilitate knowledge capture to ensure it is retained as team 
members move on. 
1. Principles and Tactics 
To address the problems described above, we revisit the Leavitt diamond as our 
framework for process reengineering. Because CNVT is such a small organization, there 
is no doubt that by redesigning processes, the environment around the processes will need 
to be adjusted to maintain stability and balance. El Sawy (2001) identifies 10 principles 
and tactics for redesigning processes that are drawn from this framework. They are 
broken down into 3 different categories: Changing the configuration and structure of 
processes, changing the information flows around processes, and changing knowledge 
management around processes. In each category, we can identify one or two principles, 
which can assist in tackling redesigning the CNVT processes to address problem areas 
and ultimately increase process capacity. Those that are most applicable are described 
below. 
For reconstructing and reconfiguring processes, principle #1 is to lose wait – 
squeezing out the wait time in a processes to increase value. From our initial data 
collection we saw that some of the processes involved rather large elapsed times because 
CNVT members were waiting for responses to emails and phone calls. Although  elapsed 
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time was not considered in our “as-is” KVA analysis, one can assume that a shorter 
elapsed time will directly translate to shorter work time since the process has become 
more streamlined.  
For changing information flows around the process there are two principles which 
can be applied. Principle 5 is to capture information digitally at the source and propagate 
it throughout the process. One way this can be accomplished is by web enabling as much 
of the process as possible and capturing information in a database. For example, 
information gathering can be web enabled to push the data entry to the customer rather 
than having the CNVT duplicate the effort when a survey is returned. Furthermore, the 
earlier you digitize the data, the more readily you can make it available for use 
throughout other processes. Principle 6 is to vitrify or provide glasslike visibility through 
fresher and richer information about a process. Both CNVT and the customer receive 
added value from increased visibility of information. For the CNVT, the value would be 
to know almost instantly where they stood in the planning stages of a network 
assessment. Customers receive value from being able to track the status of their request, 
similar to how FedEx generates value for its customers by allowing them to track the 
status of a shipment from the time it is picked up to when it is received. Also, since team 
members indicated a lot of elapsed time was attributable to trying to pull information 
from customers who were slow to complete the questionnaire, pushing the responsibility 
to the customer will prompt them to be more vigilant at providing more complete and 
timely information, especially since the status of their assessment depends on it. 
For changing knowledge management around the process, principle 9 can be 
applied. Its intent is to connect, collect, and create. In other words grow intelligently 
reusable knowledge around the process through all who touch it. The principle can be 
encompassed through development of a repository of knowledge. Enabling the reuse of 
knowledge ensures that as team members gain more and more experience, the CNVT 
organization as a whole learns as well because knowledge is transferred to the repository. 
An example would be if a Windows expert discovers something (a new technique, or new 
remedy for a particular IA vulnerability), that knowledge is documented and stored in a 
repository for the next Windows expert to be able to use. This a key contribution to the 
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overall value created because knowledge is no longer resident in the minds of team 
members and is able to be drawn from the repository at a relatively inexpensive cost.  
2. Prototype 
Having captured the value of knowledge deployed within CNVT processes and 
identified areas where process redesign and redeployment of knowledge can help 
increase process capacity, we developed a prototype that encompasses the principles of 
BPR previously discussed. This prototype addresses the recursive relationship between 
IT capabilities and BPR in that it incorporates the use of information technology to 
support redesigned processes rather than business functions. It also adheres to the two 
fundamental principles proposed by Housel and Bell (2001) of moving frequently 
deployed procedural knowledge to IT and capturing the knowledge that typically dies 
when an employee leaves. And although prototyping is the fifth and final stage of 
Davenport and Short’s five-step process, it is important to keep in mind that design of the 
prototype does not signify the end; there will be successive iterations for further 
refinement and enhancing capabilities.  
The designed prototype is a web-enabled database that facilitates capturing some 
of the tacit knowledge involved in the “administrative” core processes of a CNVT 
network assessment; request handling, information gathering, and mission planning. 
Because these processes generate the least amount of return on knowledge and IT, they 
are the focus of our efforts to more efficiently deploy knowledge and increase process 
capacity. The screen captures below illustrate the web pages of the prototype design. 
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Figure 7. Prototype Home Page 
 
The homepage is the focal point of the prototype. It provides a general overview 
of the service provided by CNVT and serves as a launching point for navigation 
throughout the rest of the website. Navigation links are located on the left side of the 
page. 
Clicking on the “New Request” link essentially walks the customers through a 
series of screens that digitally capture the information previously asked in the CNVT 
questionnaire. This is where the request for services is assigned a tracking number, 
enabling both CNVT and the customer to track the status at a later date.  
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Figure 8. New Request Page 
 
Figure 9 shows the summary of a sample request that was recalled by tracking 
number. Customers and CNVT members are able to modify, verify and add data to a 
particular request as more information becomes available by clicking on the subject tabs 
at the top of the page. 
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Figure 9. Summary of Request Page 
 
Figure 10 depicts a summary of the network topology information as entered by 
the customer. When inputting the service request, customers are prompted for this 
information in the form of drop down menu, option boxes and text boxes.  This enables 
CNVT to build a more complete picture of the network to be assessed by driving the 
customer to be very specific in the information they provide. 
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Figure 10. Network Summary Page 
 
While not every page of the prototype is depicted here, they are attached as 
Appendix B. However, as indicated in the previous figures, the web enabled database is 
quite user friendly and allows us to accomplish several objectives that are beneficial to 
knowledge intensive organizations.  From the customer perspective, the prototype 
enables them to more easily respond to the J39’s annual call for services by submitting 
responses in the form of a request via the web site. Customers are also able to complete 
the CNVT assessment questionnaire and track the status of a request online.  
The web site also serves as an information portal (linked to a database) for CNVT 
members and those associated with the network assessment core processes.  By digitally 
capturing information early, visibility is increased and they are able to see the various bits 
of information provided by the customer throughout all stages of the assessment process. 
Of value to both the CNVT and its customers is the unique ability to assign 
tracking numbers to requests when submitted. This allows customers, CNVT members, 
and the J39 representative the ability to track and monitor the status of a request from 
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start to finish. Additionally, the request tracking number can be tied to specific task lists 
(checklists) for both the J39 and CNVT to facilitate process execution. 
The prototype also provides a shared electronic database. Linked to the web-based 
input forms, this database would create shared access to information for CNVT members, 
the J39 and maybe even customers on a limited basis. Data could be tailored to exist as 
various forms and tables as dictated by CNVT needs. It can also be protected so that only 
pertinent information is made visible to appropriate personnel. An example would be an 
automatically generated list of all customers who have submitted a request in the past 
within a certain time period or a detailed listing of the findings from a previous 
assessment of a repeat customer. Such a database allows for the reuse of knowledge and 
fosters continual learning of the organization as well as individual team members. 
3. Comparisons 
Before entering into discussion of the example comparisons, it is important to 
qualify the utility of these calculations. Due to the small size of our proof of concept 
organization and limited sampling period within which we observed them, one cannot 
draw wide-ranging conclusions from these particular calculations. Furthermore, while not 
every network assessment is identical, the sampling period during which the CNVT was 
observed was assumed to be representative of the “average” network assessment.  
However, the concept behind the calculations and the approach to redesigning processes 
is general enough that the conclusions we draw from our POC can be applied to other 
knowledge intensive organizations. 
The two tables below illustrate the KVA analysis of the “as-is” and “to-be” 
versions of the three administrative processes that we attempted to redesign with the 
prototype. 




















Handling 5 8 4 2 5% 8 0.4 8.4 $320 $19 $339 
Mission 
Development 25 120 8 5 5% 120 6 126 $1,600 $39 $1,639 
Information 
Gathering 10 8 4 3 5% 8 0.4 8.4 $480 $19 $499 
Total 40 136 16 10   136 6.8 142.8 $2,400 $77 $2,477 


























Handling 5 8 2 2 70% 8 5.6 13.6 $160 $10 $170 
Mission 
Development 25 120 4 2 20% 120 24 144 $320 $20 $340 
Information 
Gathering 10 8 2 2 70% 8 5.6 13.6 $160 $10 $170 
Total 40 136 8 6   136 35.2 171.2 $640 $40 $680 
Table 15. High-level “To-Be” KVA Analysis of Three Processes 
 
Based on interviews of CNVT members and their indicated likelihood of using 
such a system if fully implemented, we estimate significant increases in the percent 
automation of the three core processes analyzed. Additionally, we further assumed that, 
with increased collaboration and more readily available information, the amount of work 
time and head count required to complete each process would be reduced. These 
differences are reflected in the “to-be” KVA analysis.  
The tables reveal several interesting points worth noting. As suspected, with an 
increase in the use of IT and decrease in head count and work time, KVA shows us an 
overall decrease in total cost and increase in total knowledge executed in completing the 
processes. We attribute the decrease in total cost to two things. First, the reduced head 
count and work time reduces hourly cost – fewer employees working less hours equals 
less cost. Additionally, since IT costs are based an allocated percentage of total work 
time, the reduction in work time for the three processes results in decreased IT costs as 
well. The increase in total knowledge is attributed to the fact that increased automation 
now makes use of knowledge used in IT. As a result, the infusion of IT produces 28.4 
more units of knowledge in addition to those units that exist in employees’ minds. These 




















Table 17. “To-Be” ROK and ROIT 
 
As shown, use of a web-enabled database to facilitate completion of these three 
processes generates significant increases in the respective returns. As another point of 




Request Handling 222.7% 2540.0% 
Mission Development 450.3% 654.3% 
Information Gathering 375.0% 2540.0% 
Aggregate 336.3% 876.1% 
Table 18. Percent Increase in ROK and ROIT 
 
To further illustrate how the use of IT has impacted the assessment process 
overall, Table 19 shows a high-level aggregate KVA analysis of the “to-be” processes. 
 
Process ROK ROIT 
Request Handling 2.48% 2.10% 
Mission Development 7.69% 15.77% 
Information Gathering 1.68% 2.10% 
Aggregate 5.77% 8.93% 
Process ROK ROIT 
Request Handling 8.00% 55.50% 
Mission Development 42.33% 118.92% 
Information Gathering 8.00% 55.50% 
Aggregate 25.16% 87.21% 
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Table 19. High-level “To-Be” KVA Analysis 
 
An important observation to note is that, while the IT costs changed for the three 
processes redesigned, the aggregate IT cost remains the same based on the assumption 
that our baseline cost for equipment is $666 per assessment and that the prototype can be 
developed in-house. The result is a cost reduction of $1760 per assessment. With an 
average of 15 assessments per year, this amounts to an annual savings of $26,400. 
Process 
Total 
K Total Cost ROK 
Request Handling 13.6 $170 8.00% 
Logistics 84 $7,503 1.12% 
Information Gathering 13.6 $170 8.00% 
Report generation 38.4 $3,001 1.28% 
Mission Development 144 $340 42.33% 
Network Assessment 1680 $8,202 20.48% 
Total 1974 $19,386 10.18% 
Table 20. “To-Be” Return on Knowledge 
 
Overall ROK for the six core processes is shown in Table 20. The slight decrease 
in the Network Assessment ROK is due to the IT cost for that process increasing slightly 
as it is reallocated based on changes in process work times. When viewed at the 
aggregate level, we see that ROK overall is only increased to 10.18% from the 9.20% 
obtained in the “as-is”. While this is appears to be a fairly insignificant increase, it is 
important to keep in mind that only the three lowest cost processes were redesigned in the 
POC case. In reengineering those processes within the constraints of this thesis, aggregate 




















Handling 5 8 2 2 70% 5.6 13.6 0.69% $10 $170 .88% 
Logistics 10 80 60 3 5% 4 84 4.26% $303 $7,503 38.70% 
Information 
Gathering 10 8 2 2 70% 5.6 13.6 0.69% $10 $170 .88% 
Report 
generation 20 32 24 3 20% 6.4 38.4 1.95% $121 $3,001 15.48% 
Mission 
Development 25 120 4 2 20% 24 144 7.30% $20 $340 1.75% 
Network 
Assessment 30 960 40 5 75% 720 1680 85.12% $202 $8,202 42.31% 
Total 100 1208 132   765.6 1974 100.00% $666 $19,386 100.00% 
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ROK for those processes was increased to 25.16% from 5.77%, an overall increase of 
336.3%. Additionally, the overall aggregate change in ROK, although small, represents a 
10.7% increase achieved in a short time period. 
C. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 
The analysis performed on the data collected leads to the overall conclusion that 
IT can be used effectively to increase the process capacity of a knowledge intensive 
organization. The incorporation of Information Technology into existing processes, in 
particular, those “as-is” processes generating returns on knowledge of less than 3 percent, 
provides a substantial increase in returns on knowledge and IT.   Replacing “stubby 
pencil” or “sneaker-net” methods with, for example, web interfaces and collaborative 
environments not only reduced process execution times, but also yielded a 336% increase 
in ROK.   
To establish a reference for increase in process capacity, we make the assumption 
that the CNVT will continue to be funded at their current level of 15 network assessments 
per year. At an “as-is” cost of $21,146 per assessment, this equates to an annual cost of 
$317,190. Based on a predicted savings of $1,760 per assessment at a cost of $19,386, 
CNVT will be able to complete a total of 16.4 assessments annually given their current 
funding level. In addition to an increase in assessment capacity, a summation of man 
hours (work time x head count) for the “as-is” and “to-be” shows 512 and 468 man hours, 
respectively. This illustrates that implementation of a simple IT solution results in a 
reduction of 44 man hours per assessment or 660 man hours per year.  
Although “webification” and automation is not true BPR according to Hammer, 
our KVA analysis clearly shows that a small infusion of a web interface for customers to 
input requests and to develop the initial topology produces immense returns. Through the 
use of a web-enabled database, processes capacity is increased by 10% while fewer 
people are required to complete processes. In an organization such as CNVT and others 
throughout DoD, this is extremely beneficial. Unlike most for-profit organizations, where 
fewer bodies equals less costs and more return on investment, in our proof of concept, 
fewer bodies required for each process means they are now more available to complete 
other processes, increasing their process capacity overall and return potential.  
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VI. DISCUSSION 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION SUMMARY 
The results of this study can best be described by addressing each specific 
research question. 
1. Increasing Capacity 
Can the capacity of knowledge intensive processes be increased using BPR and 
Knowledge Management principles?  Though our literature review revealed a number of 
ways to increase the capacity of knowledge intensive processes, this thesis demonstrated 
that the capacity of knowledge intensive processes could be increased through application 
of existing principles and methodologies. El Sawy (2001) mentions that there must be a 
catalyst that brings about the recognition that change is required.  In the case of the 
CNVT, the recognition that they needed increased process capacity served as the trigger. 
Whatever the catalyst is in any organization, however, the trigger that prompts change 
should lead to a decision to reengineer existing processes.  
To increase process capacity through process reengineering, organizations must 
also identify the framework within which their processes are executed. In this thesis, 
fundamentals of BPR were explained which helped establish a framework from which 
our case could be evaluated. This framework, El Sawy’s e-business speed loop (Figure 
4), accurately depicts the environment in which our proof of concept and other 
knowledge intensive organizations must operate. Also, corporations have to discover 
methods of identifying the knowledge associated with core processes and then find a 
method of objectively measuring the knowledge associated with each process.  For our 
purposes, the Knowledge Value Added Methodology fulfilled the requirement to capture 
and value knowledge associated with CNVT’s processes.  
With the e-business speed loop framework in mind, a process audit was 
conducted and, through the use of KVA, we were able to effectively measure the value of 
knowledge deployed within core processes and identify areas in which reengineering 
efforts should be focused.  A summary of the knowledge measurement is depicted in 
Table 11. It shows which of the core processes were generating little return and which 
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were creating the most value for the CNVT. The results served as a guide as to which 
processes our BPR efforts should be focused. 
Applying some of the principles identified by Davenport and Short and El Sawy, 
a prototype was developed using IT as a key enabler to more efficient processes. The 
results of our analysis are shown in Tables 14-20. They reveal that, through a simple 
infusion of IT to automate some of the organization’s most administrative core processes, 
process capacity could be increased as knowledge is redeployed through IT. The 
organization benefits from a significant increase in return on knowledge and IT while 
both process work time, and the head count required to execute the process, are reduced, 
thus facilitating the availability of workers to execute more processes. Additionally, our 
results show that while process capacity is increased, the reduced head count translates to 
an extra 44 man hours per assessment available that can be used for further enhancement 
of knowledge or in execution of other processes. 
2. Objective Measurement of the Value of Knowledge 
Is there a way to objectively measure the value of knowledge deployed within 
knowledge-intensive processes? As mentioned in the literature review, the KVA 
methodology was chosen over others because it offered the capability to objectively 
measure the value of knowledge across an entire organization. In application of the KVA 
methodology to this case, it was again proven to be effective at objectively measuring the 
value of knowledge. Though the KVA methodology was used in over 100 other cases, 
this thesis was a test of using the methodology to measure the value of knowledge 
deployed within knowledge-intensive processes in the information assurance context. 
Using knowledge as a surrogate for the value associated with each process, we are able to 
quantitatively measure the input knowledge required for a process to complete without 
having to establish a link to an amount of revenue that was generated in executing 
processes. Through KVA, the focus remained on deployed knowledge and, as a result, 
comparisons could be made of very different activities and processes using a common 




3. Automation of Processes 
Can repeatable processes be automated or outsourced to increase the capacity of 
the CNVT?  This thesis adequately demonstrates that repeatable processes can be 
automated to increase the capacity of the CNVT assessment process.  Through the 
effective redeployment of knowledge in IT, automation of several core processes resulted 
in decreased process completion time and fewer people required to execute each process. 
Although BPR is much more than “Web-enabling” (El Sawy, 2001, p.7), the 
incorporation of a rudimentary web portal that captured the most administrative intensive 
processes yielded an aggregate ROK of 25.16% and ROIT of 87.21% compared to 5.77% 
and 8.93%, respectively, in the “as-is” process. This amounts to increases of 336.3% and 
876.1%, respectively.  
Because of the vast complexities involved in effectively evaluating and selecting 
an organization for outsourcing within the guidelines of DoD’s numerous policies 
governing acquisition and Information Assurance, this research did not explore the 
feasibility of outsourcing CNVT functions.  
4.  Limitations 
As previously mentioned, the scope of this thesis was limited to a small 
organization and a relatively short time period. This, combined with limited access to 
personnel, did not allow for a total redesign of CNVT’s core processes. As Hammer 
(1990) points out, the ultimate purpose of reengineering through IT is to enable new 
processes rather than simply automating the existing ones. However, as Davenport and 
Short (1990) state, process redesign is an iterative process and does not end with the 
prototype. In the case of the CNVT, process automation as the first iteration was the only 
achievable goal given the constraints within which this thesis was conducted. Based on 
our observations, the current assessment process is effective but by no means efficient 
and has little room for capacity increase without the use of IT.  Knowledge-rich assets are 
used to execute logistics and travel planning processes, handle their own administration 
and could be better used in completing other tasks.  IT uses outside the normal e-mail or 
other daily business usage, is limited and lacking in all processes except the actual 
network assessment. To address these issues, future iterations can include a myriad of 
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refinements to the prototype to further increase process capacity and aid in more efficient 
use of knowledge. Such enhancements include but are not limited to: 
• A tie-in to the existing office management software. Other than meeting 
with the team leader, the J39 representative has limited visibility into the 
schedules of team members. Such a tie-in could generate a self-updating 
calendar that is refreshed as team members annotate their availability.  
• Automatic reminders. As requests are submitted, the new system could 
generate a series of emails or reminders of tasks to be completed based on 
a predefined checklist established by CNVT. 
• File sharing for increased collaboration. Similar to the technology 
developed by Groove Networks25, a further enhancement could be a 
module that facilitates file sharing in a common virtual workspace. As 
suspected and confirmed in the three administrative processes previously 
addressed, the use of IT to enable file sharing in the report generation 
process is likely to produce similar reductions in cost and increases in 
returns on knowledge and IT 
• A repository of knowledge. The database could be developed to allow 
storage of files from previous assessments. Whether it is in the form of an 
actual assessment report or simply a tips or lessons learned document from 
previous trips, such a small knowledge intensive organization will see 
significant value from the use of reusable knowledge. 
• Visibility beyond CNVT, customers and J39. Such a system should 
include visibility to all those who touch and impact CNVT’s core 
processes. An example would be including a tie-in to Legal to aid in 
completion of that portion of the process. 
•  
                                                 
25 Groove Networks is a privately held company founded in 1997. Based in Beverly, MA, the 
company provides desktop collaboration software aimed at accelerating business activity within and across 
organizational boundaries. More information can be found at http://www.groove.net 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The benefits of this research span the entire spectrum of knowledge intensive 
processes.  The ideals and data presented further confirm that the KVA methodology and 
BPR are suitable for increasing value within processes. 
1. CNVT Specific 
In the context of this research, the CNVT is a knowledge intensive organization 
that can benefit from application of the principles and methodology discussed in this 
thesis. In general, process capacity can be increased, however closer examination of the 
CNVT reveals potential opportunities to improve performance overall to help meet team 
objectives. 
a) Automate 
Though not all agree that automation is the best approach to redesigning 
process, this thesis shows that, through proper use of IT as an enabler, automating basic 
processes can yield substantial returns on knowledge and ultimately increase process 
capacity. While the scope of our BPR efforts were only focused on three of CNVT’s most 
administrative processes, KVA analysis showed that other process could be improved as 
well. CNVT should consider further development of the designed prototype to include 
addressing the limitations previously discussed and further expansion to incorporate all of 
its core processes.  
Although contracting this requirement to an outside source is a viable 
option, the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) provides a cost effective resource of talent 
that can be used to further enhance the capabilities of the prototype. CNVT should 
seriously consider NPS and its pool of thesis students as an option for future prototype 
development.  
b) Advocacy 
Our interviews and research revealed that CNVT could further benefit 
from more advocacy within the National Security Agency (NSA), their parent 
organization. Although successful at meeting the obligations and fulfilling the current 
goals of the PACOM Combatant Commander, all indications are that demand for their 
services within PACOM’s AOR will continue to increase, thus the need for increased 
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process capacity. This thesis has shown that increased capacity can be achieved though 
application of BPR principles and the use of IT. However, their increased potential will 
not be fully realized unless they are funded to support more than the current 10 to 15 
missions per year. This will require more support from within PACOM and from their 
parent organization. 
c) Administration of Tasks  
The current method of obtaining information about customer networks to 
be assessed requires CNVT members to actively participate in establishing points of 
contact with the customer and “pulling” information from them. While the prototype 
shifts the information gathering to more of a “pull” type environment, until fully 
implemented, CNVT members will still have to liaison with the customer prior to 
executing a mission. The use of CNVT personnel to liaison with customers and 
accomplish other logistical tasks such as travel planning and basic administrative duties is 
an extremely inefficient use of knowledge-rich assets, as indicated by the low ROK’s 
generated. An effective remedy would be to establish an administrative assistant to serve 
as a single point of contact for all liaisons with CNVT customers and absorb the 
responsibility of executing the remaining administrative type processes. Establishing such 
a position facilitates a more effective means of communication since all information 
about customers will flow through one person. In addition, team members’ time can more 
effectively be used to conduct training or tend to other matters that enhance their 
knowledge. 
d) Train 
This thesis clearly illustrates that CNVT process capacity can be 
increased. However, the increased potential can not be fully realized until the decision is 
made to act on the information provided. It is simple to infuse the IT solution yet regress 
by continuing to produce the same amount of assessments by taking longer to execute 
processes since the extra time is available. A much more challenging and beneficial task, 
however, is to utilize the extra capacity and available man hours in developing a training 
regimen to further enhance team members’ knowledge. With the steady proliferation of 
new technology such as wireless capabilities throughout DoD’s networks, CNVT would 
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surely benefit from using enhancing their knowledge of these areas to better prepare them 
for future network assessments.   
2. General 
a) Champion of Change 
Within the proof of concept used in this thesis, it was clearly evident that 
the focus organization was committed to making a change. However, in organizations 
where personnel are firmly entrenched on conducting business processes a certain way, 
effecting even the slightest incremental change might not be an easy task. As the 
literature review revealed, the most common cause of BPR failure is lack of sustained 
commitment from management and leadership. In most redesign efforts, there will 
undoubtedly be resistance to change from within, as the “rice bowl”26 effect tends to 
shape attitudes towards change. Such resistance can be overcome, however, if there are 
champions of change within the organization who effectively communicate and embody 
what the change is about.  
b) Self Evaluate 
Throughout any knowledge intensive organization, the need to continually 
self-evaluate cannot be underscored enough. In today’s global economy, the 
environments in which organizations have established strongholds are constantly 
changing. As a result, the means by which a firm maintains its stronghold must 
continually change as well. Self-evaluation provides a means for companies to assess 
processes and identify areas that can be approved. This self-assessment should be focused 
on identifying which processes are creating the most value for the company and which 
are generating the least amount of return. For knowledge intensive organizations, the 
focus should be identifying means of efficiently deploying knowledge assets to ensure 
they are utilized to maximum capacity. This thesis identified a method that allows 
organizations to accomplish this. However, not every organization is ripe for a BPR 
project. Where total process redesign is not an option, simply identifying a means to 
streamline a single process through more efficient knowledge deployment, rather than 
                                                 
26 The “rice bowl” effect refers to the belief that as elements of change are introduced, the power and 
authority of an individual or organization is reduced, resulting in increased resistance to implementation by 
that individual or organization.  
 74
redesigning it all together, is likely to yield significant improvements in ROK. As such, 
companies should always self evaluate to determine where value creation could be 











































APPENDIX A. SAMPLE OPERATIONAL EVALUATION 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
In order to scope the effort involved for the operational evaluation, CNVT asks 
questions that are typical of any computer network assessment. For classification 
purposes, the actual CNVT operational evaluation questionnaire was excluded to keep 
this thesis unclassified. In lieu of the CNVT questionnaire, a similar self assessment 
questionnaire is included. Although much broader in scope, this questionnaire adequately 




1. Has senior management, including the corporate or organizational 
board of directors, established an appropriate information and 
Internet security policy and an auditing process? 
 
2. Is security viewed as an overhead activity or essential to business 
survivability? Are security considerations a routine part of your 
normal business processes? 
 
3. Are there legal or regulatory requirements that you should be complying 
with because of either contract commitments or the industry 
sector in which you operate? 
 
4. Do managers at each level of the organization understand their roles 
and responsibilities with respect to information security? How do you 




5. What are your organization's most important security policies and 
what business objectives do they help satisfy? 
 
6. What is your role in ensuring that security policies are followed? 
 
7. What are the consequences for non-compliance? 
 
8. Is there potential liability for not exercising an appropriate standard 
of due care? 
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9. If you are a publicly traded company and conduct business on the 
Internet, are risks to e-commerce revenues reported in annual reports? 
Risk 
==== 
10. How does your organization identify critical information assets and 
risks to those assets? 
 
11. Are there any critical assets for which you are responsible? 
 
12. Is the frequency and scope of your risk evaluation sufficient to take 
evolving threats into account? 
 
13. Are risks to critical assets managed in a similar fashion to other key 
business risks? Are all critical assets reviewed in an annualexternal audit? 
 
14. What are the potential financial impacts of a successful attack 
against these assets? 
 
15. Do you have adequate insurance policies? 
 
Security, Architecture and Design 
================================= 
16. What are the primary components of your organization's security 
architecture? Does your due diligence and due care process include 
reviews of outsourced resources? 
 
17. What business objectives does your security architecture help satisfy? 
 
18. Do you have a process to determine the security impact of linking 
new systems to your enterprise-wide architecture? 
 
19. What assets are most securely protected and why? What are the five 
most critical business functions that depend on these assets? 
 
20. If you don't know, whom do you ask? 
 
Accountability and Training 
=========================== 
21. When was the last time you and other senior managers, including 
your board, received a briefing or attended user training on 
information security as practiced in your organization? 
 
22. Is your corporate audit function included in security policy and 
practices reviews? Is there an auditable process with defined 
exception policies to limit the corporation's liability if an employee 
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uses computing resources for malicious or illegal purposes? 
 





24. When was the last time you and other senior managers, including 
your board, received a briefing or attended user training on 
information security as practiced in your organization? 
 
25. Is your corporate audit function included in security policy and 
practices reviews? Is there an auditable process with defined 
exception policies to limit the corporation's liability if an employee 
uses computing resources for malicious or illegal purposes? 
 





27. How do you ensure that each employee only has access to the files, 
directories, and applications commensurate with their job responsibilities 
and their need to know? How often are permissions reviewed 
for appropriateness and accuracy? 
 
28. How do you create a public/private key pair to encrypt sensitive 
information? 
 
29. How do you share your public key with others and how do they share 




30. What is the responsibility of users, including senior management, to 
safely operate systems? 
 
31. How often do you scan for viruses on your desktop and laptop systems? 
 
32. What actions do you take if you discover a virus? 
 
33. How do you recover compromised files? 
 
34 How do you contain the damage caused by a virus? 
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35. How do you avoid propagating a virus to others? 
 
36. How do you verify that a recently created file has not been 
tampered with? 
 
37. Do your administrators regularly scan for the presence of viruses, 




38. What do you do when you want to retrieve a backup file that you 
inadvertently deleted? How long does this take? 
 
39. What is your role in backing up the user data on your desktop 
and laptop? 
 
Authentication and Authorization of Users 
========================================= 
40. What means of identification and authentication do you need for 
accessing the systems you use every day? For accessing critical, more 
highly protected systems that you may need to use from time to time? 
 
41. How do you access your organization's network and systems when 
you are working from home or when traveling? Are you allowed to 
dial directly into modems attached to desktops or servers? 
 
42. Is your access restricted compared to what you can do when you are 
in the office? 
 
43. Do you have decision processes and supporting procedures in place 
to permit third party access, manage each type of relationship with 
the appropriate level of security, and retire or update accounts when 
partnerships terminate? 
 
44. If you don't know, whom do you ask? 
 
Monitor and Alert 
================= 
45. When something doesn't look quite right on your system, whom do 
you call and what information do you need to provide to describe 
the problem? 
 
46. Have your systems ever been compromised? How do you know? 
 




48. Do your system and network administrators have an active contact 
list of peers for the primary networks with which yours interface? 
 
49. Are your administrators up to date on the latest threats, attacks, and 




50. What means of identification and authentication do you need for 
accessing the primary facility where your office is? Critical facilities 
that you are required to visit from time to time? 
 
51. What assurances do you have that physical security access restrictions 
are being followed? How are violations reported to you? 
 
52. Do you know whom to contact if you detect suspicious letters, 
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APPENDIX B PROTOTYPE WEBSITE 
 
CNVT Home Page 
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CNVT Mission Page 
 
CNVT Process Page 
 
 83
CNVT New Request Page 
 
CNVT Info Summary Page 
 
 84
CNVT Goals and Objectives Page 
 
CNVT Target Systems Page 
 
 85
CNVT Network Background Page 
 
CNVT Network Protocols Page 
 
 86
CNVT Network Hardware Page 
 
CNVT Network Software Page 
 
 87
CNVT Network Security Page 
 
CNVT Network POC’s Page 
 
 88
CNVT Track a Request Page 
 
CNVT Modify Visit Info Page 
 
 89
CNVT Modify Command Info Page 
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